Religious Freedom and Domestic Terrorism in Asia and Africa, 2000-2009:
An Epitaph for the Religious Freedom Peace Thesis?

by

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Abstract

The Religious Freedom Peace Thesis (RFPT) suggests that societies may reduce political violence by fully respecting individuals' rights to live their faiths according to the dictates of their convictions, but little empirical evidence supports this contention. I redress this evidentiary lacuna by subjecting the RFPT to empirical examination. First though, I attempt to refine the RFPT by proposing a conditional model of political violence that turns to John Locke's seminal works on religious toleration to link competing approaches to religion and violence, including the so-called "clash of civilizations" and an under-theorized empirical phenomenon described as the "diversity dividend." The neo-Lockean variant of the RFPT contends that the effects of religious diversity on political violence—domestic terrorism, to be more specific—are conditioned by a regime's church-state relationship. As such, I examine the possibility that religious heterogeneity drives terrorism under conditions of religious non-freedom. Since the neo-Lockean model is a Western-centric approach to political violence contingent upon Western values (i.e., religious freedom) though, I subject several hypotheses drawn from the RFPT to a battery of statistical analyses intentionally using data drawn from the non-Western world: namely, Asia and Africa from 2000-2009. I ultimately find no empirical support for the RFPT (even its more sophisticated neo-Lockean variant), and while this may stem from limitations in the data, it opens current religious freedom research to critical evaluation, particularly regarding its imperialistic implications.

For Jeannie, for her love and support; and
for our children, Madelyn, Lillian, Kennedy, and Cohen,
that their future may be free of fear.

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Thanks to my own failings, this thesis is far from perfect. Nevertheless, I could not have completed it, or developed it into its present state without the assistance of many people. First, I must thank the members of my committee, Nazli Avdan, Mariya Y. Omelicheva, and Hal Elliott Wert. Their collective influence can hopefully be felt throughout the corpus of my argument, and their thoughtful comments and criticisms have shaped and will continue to shape my research in productive ways. I am especially grateful to Professor Avdan for taking me on as my advisor. I counted her feedback as one of my greatest assets throughout the course of my writing. I am also quite grateful to Professor Wert for taking time in the summer of 2015 to listen to my thoughts as I worked out the initial arguments for this thesis. I will always cherish our lunch meetings at Dixon's Chili Parlor where we held court on many occasions. Part of my research could not have been completed without the financial support of the Thompson Foundation, which generously awarded me with its Walter Thompson Scholarship in the summer of 2015. For that reason, I am also appreciative to Professor Omelicheva for taking me on as one of her research assistants for that project.

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and Terilyn have been especially helpful in ensuring that I always remember (or at least try to remember) to challenge my own assumptions, but the feedback I received from all three has been indelible.

Of course, this project has also been made possible by building on the works of those who have come before me. There are obviously many—too many to name, in fact—but at least two deserve mention. In particular, I am grateful to Thomas Farr, whose work in World of Faith and Freedom (2008) has been hugely influential to me (my forthcoming critique, notwithstanding). Second, I am grateful to Elizabeth Shakman Hurd and her Beyond Religious Freedom, an important work to which I am heavily indebted. More directly, Dr. Richard E. Berkebile helped me by sharing his domestic terrorism dataset; James A. Piazza assisted by offering his dataset on Islam and terrorism; and James Raymond Vreeland helped by sharing his X-Polity data. I must also thank John Falconer for taking the time to respond to my inquires about the data he and his colleagues used in Terrorism, Instability and Democracy in Asia and Africa (2009).

I presented an earlier version of this thesis at the annual meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion and the Religious Research Association in Newport Beach, California on October 24, 2015. I am thankful for the feedback I received from those attending the panel, including Peter Balint and Robert Vandenberg. I have tried to incorporate their insights where relevant, and believe this project would not have been as strong without their helpful criticism. That paper also developed out of an earlier project, and so I am grateful to a number of the faculty at the University of Kansas and my colleagues for their feedback at that embryonic stage, including Gail Buttorff, Paul Johnson, Alesha Doan, and Brittnee Carter. A number of others, including Ranya Ahmed, Cagil Albayrak, Sammy Badran, Richard Botkin,

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And, of course, it almost goes without saying that any remaining errors are my own.

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1 | Introduction

Like any other morning at the daycare, children in fresh from drop off were probably at play, their laughter hanging in the air, itself pregnant with the possibilities of their futures. It was, of course, just another ordinary Wednesday in Oklahoma City—at least until it wasn't. At 9:02 AM, Timothy McVeigh detonated the 4800 lb. explosive device he and Terry Nichols planted in a Ryder moving truck parked outside of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building. The structure's façade collapsed, resulting in 168 deaths and another 650 injuries (Durham 1996; Smith 2015; Walsh 2008). Nineteen of the twenty-five children in the second-floor daycare also died, including Baylee Amon, an infant whose death in the arms of fire-fighter Chris Fields was immortalized in a haunting and heart-wrenching photograph that would later be awarded the Pulitzer Prize.[1] To this day, the episode stands out as the most destructive instance of domestic terrorism ever to take place on American soil, and its violence has only been surpassed by the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11). McVeigh's stated aim was to avenge the Branch Davidians after a Federal government siege on their Waco, Texas compound resulted in the deaths of 83 men, women, and children exactly two-years earlier. While the Bureau of Alcohol, Tabaco, and Fire Arms (ATF) may point to allegations of child abuse and weapons stockpiling as the impetus for the siege, some of the Branch Davidians see the standoff as the culmination of years of religious persecution. McVeigh might agree, but none of Davidians hold any sympathy for the man who was executed for his role in the 19 April 1995 bombing. Rather, survivors of the 1993 assault erected a headstone at the Waco compound to memorialize McVeigh's victims (Smith 2015; Verhovek 2001; Walsh 2008).

Some twenty years later, and nearly 5000 miles away, another terrorist attack would result in the deaths of 130 Parisians. In a climate of anti-Islamic sentiment, the series of bombings and shootings that broke out on 13 November 2015 were initially believed by some to be the work of Syrian refugees. In reality, several recently radicalized French and Belgian nationals were behind the *homegrown*[2] plot (Guo 2015; Richards 2015), but facts aside, the events of that fateful Paris night would add fuel to the fire of nativist Islamophobia in both Europe and the United States of America (U.S.). For example, the then-improbable[3] Republican nominee for president, Donald J. Trump, issued a series of venomous statements leveled at the American Muslim community and the wider world of Islam in response to the Paris attacks. Trump, the billionaire businessman whose candidacy for president has revealed him to be a staunch xenophobe, said he would shutter American mosques (Krieg 2015), called for a database of Muslim citizens (Diamond 2015a), and said he would also consider surveilling any mosques not slated for closure (Mark and Diamond 2015). Shortly thereafter, in response to the December 2 shootings in San Bernadino, California, Trump even called for a ban on all Muslim immigration to the U.S., suggesting that Muslims would be prohibited from entering the nation until "our country's representatives can figure out what is going on" (Diamond 2015b). The vacuity of Trump's statement notwithstanding, that his rhetoric is clearly meant to play on nativist fears should come as no surprise. Fear of the outsider, after all, is a basic component of human nature as old as civilization itself (if not older),[4] and terrorism often contributes to political intolerance (Peffley, et al. 2015) while eroding support for democratic norms (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009). Yet, Trump's draconian proposals should be taken seriously, for they smack of the same kind of religious persecution as that perceived to be experienced by the Branch Davidians—the same kind McVeigh used to justify the Oklahoma City Bombing.

In other words, the commonality that unites these two disparate instances of domestic terrorism, despite their distance in time and space, is a concern with religious persecution. In the case of the Oklahoma City Bombing, grievances were at play, hinting at the causal implications of religious persecution. In Trump's case, counterterrorism takes on the greatest salience as politicians and publics work out a response to perceived episodes of religiously motivated violence. Together therefore, these cases point to two questions, one empirical and one normative. Is terrorism related to religious persecution? How should states respond to religious violence? A growing body of scholarly research, described by diplomatic historian Andrew Preston (2013) as "a faith-inflected version of democratic peace theory," would see these questions as intimately linked. Scholars, such as Thomas Farr (2008), who served as the first director for the U.S. Department of State's Office of International Religious Freedom, might answer the first question affirmatively, while responding to the second with two words: religious freedom. That is, these scholars have articulated a simple theory, what I describe as the Religious Freedom Peace Thesis (RFPT), which sees religious oppression and regulation as one of the primary drivers of all kinds of political violence. For instance, Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke (2011) link increased restrictions on religious activity with increased instances of hate crime, terrorism, and even war. In some respects, it thus seems as if the RFPT treats religious freedom as a panacea for many of the world's problems, but empirical research on the efficacy of religious freedom policy is lacking,[5] making it difficult to evaluate the validity these claims.

There is anecdotal support for the RFPT though. By trying to understand the motives of some terrorist organizations the connection between the empirical and normative questions seems quite apparent. That is, the real-world implications of Trump's proposals, for instance, would seem to exacerbate the threat of terrorism, at least in some cases. Indeed, militants with

the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) insurgency are hopeful that the West will respond to acts of terrorism in exactly this way. As several media outlets, including *The Washington Post* (Guo 2015), *The Nation* (Editorial 2015), and *Newsweek* (Gude 2015b) to name only three, have reported, Islamophobia plays right into ISIS's larger narrative and global strategy. ISIS perceives its conflict with the West in absolute terms; theirs is a black and white worldview that divides the world between two camps: the camp of Islam, and the camp of the Crusaders. There is also a third—the "gray zone"—but ISIS's goal is the eradication of this camp. Gray Muslims—moderates, in Western parlance—are said to include all those confused Muslims and apostates that have tried to adopt a position of neutrality in the Salafi war against the West.[6] ISIS's hope is that by provoking governments to overreact against Western Muslims in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, the alienated Muslims of the gray zone will be forced to pick sides, essentially tricking the West into destroying the gray zone on ISIS' behalf (Gude 2015a). As argued in *Dabiq*, the ISIS propaganda rag, operations carried out by the mujahidin against the West are meant to "[compel] the crusaders to actively destroy the grayzone themselves, the zone in which many of the hypocrites and deviant innovators living in the West are hiding" (ISIS 2015). In other words, ISIS actually intends the anti-Islamic backlash championed in the West by politicians like Trump to radicalize moderate Muslims, to inspire them to carry out *homegrown* terror attacks in the West as happened in Paris, and ultimately to trigger a real life "clash of civilizations" (Gude 2015a-b; also see Huntington 1993a, 1996).

Trump's proposals thus stand at odds with the tenets of the religious freedom research agenda, and if the RFPT is right, he could give organizations like ISIS exactly what they want. With so much at stake in the debate over a proper response to religious violence, this thesis therefore attempts to redress this evidentiary lacuna by subjecting the RFPT to empirical

examination. However, I attempt to further develop the RFPT by proposing a conditional model of political violence that turns to John Locke's (1667; 1689) seminal works on religious toleration. Doing so allows me to link different approaches to religion[7] and violence, including the so-called "clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1993a, 1996) and an under-theorized empirical phenomenon described by Dan G. Cox, John Falconer, and Brian Stackhouse (2009; hereinafter CFS) as the "diversity dividend." This neo-Lockean variant of the RFPT contends that the effects of religious diversity on political violence—domestic terrorism, to be more specific—are conditioned by a regime's church-state relationship. As such, I examine the possibility that religious heterogeneity could lead to a clash-of-civilizations-style spike in terrorism under conditions of religious non-freedom. Religious freedom, by comparison, should ameliorate such violence as the proponents of the RFPT might suggest. Resultantly, by drawing on recent research on international religious freedom (e.g. Farr 2008; Grim and Finke 2011), this neo-Lockean model of political violence may be able to reconcile the expectations of Samuel Huntington's (1993a, 1996) "clash of civilizations" thesis with contradictory findings that point to the stabilizing effect of religious (and possibly also ethnic) diversity (Cox 2015).

Several hypotheses stem from this model, and since it is a Western-developed model dealing with a Western value (i.e., religious freedom), I subject these hypotheses to a battery of statistical analyses intentionally using data drawn from the non-Western world. In doing so, I also follow CFS (2009) by empirically examining Cox's (2015) claim that the RFPT can account for his and his colleague's discovery of the diversity dividend by turning to a similar universe of cases. Their original analysis, that is, also focused on Asia and Africa. However, I ultimately find no empirical support for the RFPT (even its more sophisticated neo-Lockean variant). This

may result from the limitations of the data, but it nevertheless opens current religious freedom research to critical evaluation, particularly regarding its imperialistic implications.

Throughout the remainder of this chapter, I will lay the groundwork for this thesis to explore the relationship between religious freedom and domestic terrorism in greater depth. In the next section, I disentangle the various forms of political violence associated with the RFPT, laying all but domestic terrorism aside. I return to the subject of religious violence thereafter; then I explore the importance of social, political, and economic context to religious violence in the subsequent section. These two sections are important in that they introduce competing views of religion and violence. An overview of the thesis concludes the chapter.

The RFPT and Political Terror

Although religious freedom may not effectively mitigate *domestic* terrorism, the RFPT treats religious freedom as a possible solution for all kinds of religious and political violence (as noted above). But religious and political violence come in many forms, each of which may be influenced by a unique data generating process, making it particularly important to disaggregate and disambiguate one from another. Unfortunately, one of the only empirical studies to link religious freedom with political violence aggregates hate crimes with terrorism and war (Girm and Finke 2011). Grim and Finke (2011) compare average legal restrictions on religious groups to average levels of violence, and find that the two are strongly correlated, but it's unclear why hate crime, terrorism, and war would be lumped together in such a way. David Muchlinksi (2014) also finds some evidence for the RFPT, but he focuses exclusively on hate crime—religiously motivated killings to be more specific. His study also stands out for linking religious violence to regime type, as he finds religiously motivated hate crimes to be most common under conditions of anocracy. Building on his earlier work with Falconer and Stackhouse (CFS 2009),

Cox (2015) suggests that the reduction of terrorism associated with increasing levels of religious diversity—the diversity dividend—may provide evidence for Farr's (2008) theory of religious freedom, but this claim is problematic because the number of religions in a society only effectively measures diversity, not religious freedom. Of course, religious freedom and diversity are expected to be related, as Grim and Finke (2006) have previously shown, but these are conceptually distinct categories, and the latter can only be used to directly test the diversity dividend and clash of civilizations thesis. As such, there is a real need to clarify the relationship between religious freedom and terrorism.

So, if terrorism is different from other forms of political violence like hate crimes and warfare, how should it be classified? CFS (2009) define terrorism as any violent act perpetrated by a non-state actor against civilians to influence policy (also see Cox 2005), illustrating that useful definitions usually identify the perpetrators of terrorist violence as non-state actors and their victims as noncombatants while treating their motives as inherently political in nature (CFS 2009; also see Enders, Sanders, and Gaibulloev 2011). There may be additional features worthy of note (CFS 2009; Pillar 2001; Schmid and Jongman 2008), and these specific criteria are not without controversy,[8] but since these three elements seem to be the most important, I follow Walter Enders, Todd Sandler, and Khusrav Gaibulloev (2011: 321) in defining terrorism as "the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups against noncombatants in order to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims."

Domestic terrorism, of course, "has consequences for only the host country, its institutions, people, property and policies" (Sandler 2004: 165), which means that the nationality of its victims and perpetrators must all match that of the venue where an attack takes place



Figure 1. The total number of domestic terror attacks suffered by Asian and African states, 2000-2010 Berkebile 2015; RDWTI 2016).

(Berkebile 2015). Yet, scholars have only recently tried to address domestic terror with the same vigor as previous research on transnational terrorism (e.g., Choi and Piazza 2016; CFS 2009; Klein 2015; Piazza 2011, 2015a-b; Sanchez-Cuenca and de la Calle 2009). Unfortunately, this may represent a real danger since episodes of domestic terror account for the vast majority of terrorist attacks (Berkebile 2015; also see Abadie 2006), and because some scholars worry that the threat posed by domestic terror could be growing around the globe (CFS 2009). As illustrated in Figure 1 though, this claim is somewhat difficult to evaluate because the annual number of domestic terrorist attacks reported for Asia and Africa in different datasets vary wildly. This sort of confusion signals a need for further research on domestic terrorism, so this thesis specifically sets out to evaluate the relationship between religious freedom and domestic terror. Of course, a focus on domestic terrorism is also theoretically important, because it is unclear why a religiously aggrieved population might lash out abroad when the religious persecution that allegedly motivates its use of violence likely emanates from its home governments.

The Ambivalence of the Sacred?

Does the concern with the grievances engendered by religious persecution make certain acts of domestic terrorism like the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building special? Should the religious nature of these attacks—in Paris, Oklahoma City, or anywhere else for that matter—be treated as consequential to an analysis of domestic terrorism? Since these are empirical questions, the answer is probably yes. Religiously motivated violence may be different from violence motivated by other phenomena, and scholars can compare the two to determine how they are different. However, some research (and polemic) on religious violence attempts to assign blame to religion for all kinds of violence *a priori* (Harris 2004; Maher 2008), by assuming that religion is *the* cause of violence in human affairs rather than just a factor, and by assuming that religion always causes violence without acknowledging the positive ways religion may contribute to public life.

Admittedly, major incidents of religiously inspired violence are easy to tally; if pressed for an illustration, it would come as no surprise if an individual chosen at random could readily point to the Crusades, the Inquisition, or the 9/11 terror attacks. If challenged to identify an example of prosocial religious behavior, however, at least some individuals might be hard pressed to think of an example so quickly. Still, there are many. For instance, Pope Francis and the diplomatic machinery of the Holy See were recently credited for their role in mediating the emerging détente between the U.S. and Cuba (Miller and Dias 2014). Similarly, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD) frequently pursue faith-based conflict resolution strategies in places as diverse as the Balkans, Kashmir, and even Israel (Embree 2003; Gopin 2003; Steele 2003). In the U.S., where Evangelicals are typically known for their conservative social activism, many have partnered with abolitionist feminists in the fight to end sex trafficking at home and abroad

(Bernstein 2010). Meanwhile, advocates of interfaith dialogue, such as Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf (2005) and his Cordoba Initiative, actively work to repair relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in the West and abroad. Moderates like Rauf—the gray zone Muslims detested by ISIS-affiliated extremists—are even praised as the key to defeating Islamic radicalism and winning the war on terror, so their interfaith enterprises have, at least to an extent, received support from conservatives and liberals alike (Zakaria 2010).

Like many human inventions then, religion, as these examples make clear, can contribute to the general wellbeing of a society in deep and meaningful ways, even though it may also have the capacity to facilitate violence. R. Scott Applebee (2000) describes this duality as "the ambivalence of the sacred," and suggests that it would be disingenuous to focus on one aspect of this apparent binary at the expense of another (also see Eller 2010; Omelicheva 2016). Doing so would "smack of reductionism," he argues. Nevertheless, debates over religion and violence do exactly this: they overemphasize the actions of those religious actors found on one side while minimizing the behavior of competing groups. For example, primordialist theories of religious violence treat religious identity as a major source of tension between rival groups, and as such, posit religious differences as the cause of terrorism, ethnic violence, and warfare (Fox and Sandler 2004). Some of the more tempered primordialist approaches, like Huntington's (1993a, 1996) clash of civilizations thesis, might come off as agnostic to the prosocial dimension of religious belief, but the fact is that he sees religious identity as sowing the seeds of conflict precisely because different religious affinities lead to different interests, ultimately precluding the possibility of cooperation between different groups (also see Fox and Sandler 2004; Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003; Lynch 2009, 2014).

Huntington's New Atheist acolytes are more explicit though. They like to portray religion as always and everywhere useless, harmful, or outright violent (e.g., Harris 2004; Maher 2008; also see Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011). Rather than ignoring the prosocial contributions of modern religious actors the way Huntington does, the New Atheists dismiss them outright. For instance, Sam Harris (2004) maintains that there is no such thing as a "moderate" Muslim (or a moderate religious actor of any kind for that matter). Indeed, where Huntington's former student Fareed Zakaria (2010) might call for support of moderates like Rauf, Harris maintains that the normative justification for moderation only exists because people irrationally see the religious experience as producing some sort of benefit, while they instead treat incarnations of religious violence instrumentally. In other words, Harris opposes the idea that corrupt religious actors only behave violently because of their ulterior politico-economic motivations. Instead, he sees them as violent to the core, while non-violent religious actors are only "moderate" because they have made a conscious choice to reject theological tenets at odds with modernity. By contrast, comedian Bill Maher (2008), another of Harris' ilk, concedes that there are benefits to religious belief, but with greed, terrorism, homophobia, child abuse, and warfare on his mind, Maher argues that these benefits come at too high a cost.

The New Atheists do have one point that should be taken seriously though. Those perceived as apologists for religion often fail to take seriously the possibility that genuine religious beliefs could lead to violence or self-sacrifice (Applebee 2000). On this point, some American conservatives often find themselves in agreement with the intellectual liberals counted among the New Atheists. For example, media personality Glenn Beck (2015) is highly critical of attempts by President Barack Obama and liberal think tanks, like the Center for American Progress (CAP), to absolve Islam of its connection to violence. For his part, the president has

stated that ISIS is not Islamic primarily because the majority of its victims have been Muslims (e.g., Obama 2014). Meanwhile, organizations like CAP tend to point out that violence captures the media's attention more easily than does coexistence, providing a platform for extremists to project their vision of religion to the world, despite their status as part of a fringe minority (Volsky and Jenkins 2014). So, while some might criticize the president or his fellow progressives of naiveté, other observers (e.g. McKay 2012; Herrington and McKay 2015) have pointed out that the New Atheists and American conservatives are less concerned with understanding the nature of religion and violence than they are in spewing anti-Islamic polemic. Rather than taking both sides of religious ambivalence seriously, they simply prey on the public's anti-Islamic attitudes. Nevertheless, the president and CAP may legitimately be faulted for their failure to acknowledge the possibility that religion can exacerbate or provoke outbursts of violent behavior.

On one hand, theirs is a normative approach that simply seeks to discipline religious extremists into conformity with Western sensibilities (Hurd 2015). On the other hand, they treat religion instrumentally, meaning they see religion as a tool used to undergird one's authority over a believing public through the promise of future rewards (Fox and Sandler 2004; Lynch 2014; Omelicheva 2016). The president is hardly the only person to treat the phenomenon of religiously infused terrorism in this way though. Robert Pape's (2006) work on suicide terrorism dismisses religious explanations in favor of a strategic logic, but instrumentalist studies such as his fall into the same trap by completely divorcing religion from associated forms of violence (Lynch 2009). This is hardly surprising though. The instrumentalization of religion entails its mobilization as a resource directed at achieving one's true goals, which are usually economic, political, or strategic in nature (Fox and Sandler 2004; Lynch 2009). Nevertheless, religion has

always been capable of functioning as this kind of resource because of the genuinely held beliefs of the public. The instrumentalization of religion may operate, as Mariya Y. Omelicheva (2016: 145) avers, through a "discursive process of packaging the references to religion with certain themes and emotional appeals for the purpose of power legitimization," but that's because these discursive representations are presented to a public open to such ideas. Yet, religion can do more than legitimize a leader's authority or agenda. As Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler (2004) observe, instrumentalists see religion as a valuable asset in the construction and maintenance of socio-political order (e.g., Herrington 2012). In this respect, analyzing an organization like ISIS instrumentally makes a lot of sense given its attempts to reestablish the Islamic caliphate. Additionally, anyone—a politician, a terrorist, or someone else—can instrumentalize religion, particularly in the face of economic decline or state collapse (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003). Religion can thus function as a powerful tool for anyone seeking to fill a political void, or for anyone seeking to distract a believing public from socio-economic concerns. As Karl Marx (1844) claims, "it [religion] is the *opium* of the people" (author's emphasis).

Since the RFPT posits a contextual explanation for political violence, it falls under the rubric of the neo-Weberian approach (Lynch 2009, 2014) to religion in International Relations (IR). Of course, the RFPT does not deny that religion itself may play a causal role in the propagation of terrorist violence, and since there is nothing about instrumentalism that is necessarily incompatible with primordialism (Fox and Sandler 2004), I suggest that the same is true of the neo-Weberian approach. Even Huntington (2001) acknowledges that "Muslim wars" are rooted in instrumentalist concerns with politics, though he argues that they have the potential to "congeal" into a clash of civilizations. Rather than assuming that religion is always and everywhere violent as the narrow primordialist approaches employed by the New Atheists do, or

assuming that violence only manifests when religion is (ab)used for instrumental reasons, the neo-Weberian approach thus tries to take both sides of religious ambivalence seriously. It recognizes that religion can be violent, but that it can also foster prosocial benefits for public life, and instead seeks to understand why and when religious actors may behave in one way or the other by examining the social, political, and economic contexts in which religious actors may operate.

Why Context Matters

To understand what's at stake in this debate over religious violence, and why context matters, consider the following two examples. First, though the more conservative estimate from the RDWTI (2016) indicates that Uganda has suffered only 63 terror attacks since the 1970s, it may have experienced as many as 350 since 1970 (Berkebile 2015; START 2016). Several hundred of those attacks have been attributed to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a Christian extremist organization with roots in the poorly educated Catholic protest movements of the rural north. CFS (2009, 184-187) rightly treat the LRA as a continuation of past violence, but act surprised at its nasty legacy because their assumption that Uganda has long been free from "political struggle between rival groups" is based on an abridged understanding of the nation's history. In fact, though Uganda's constitution guarantees religious freedom for all of its citizens, including the three primary religious groups in the nation (Republic of Uganda 1995), Muslims, Anglicans, and Catholics have long vied for primacy over the state. The problem is that CFS cite Rita M. Byrnes' (1992) study on Uganda, which notes the peaceful transition from British colonial rule that resulted in a series of compromises between different factions, while overlooking the earlier heritage of religious violence imprinted on Uganda in the late-1800s. The emergence of a military alliance between Anglican and Catholic missionaries to the Kingdom of Buganda in the 1880s led to the defeat of Buganda's Muslim rulers. Afterwards, the

Christian alliance itself broke, sparking a series of Anglo-Catholic religious conflicts in 1888 that culminated in 1892 in a civil war. It was the emergence of Idi Amin Dada though that gave form to old Muslim grievances against Christians, leading to the deaths of more than 100,000 Ugandans. The ouster of Idi Amin led in turn to the installation of a more secular government when Yoweri Museveni's Anglican-based National Resistance Movement came to power, but Joseph Kony's Catholic-based LRA emerged in 1987 as a result of that transition (Byrnes 1992; CFS 2009; Curtin 2000; Kiyimba 1990 and 2012; and Twesigye 2010 and 2012).

By contrast, the situation in Malawi 800 miles to the south is quite different. Unlike Uganda, Malawi has only experienced four terrorist attacks since 1970 (Berkebile 2015; START 2016).[9] CFS (2009, 194-198) attribute this stability to, *inter alia*, a combination of tribal and ethnic diversity, the early emergence of a common national identity, and economic stability. Like Uganda, Malawi's constitution also guarantees religious freedom, but unlike Uganda, the Malawian government has consistently acted in accord with these constitutional principles (Republic of Malawi 1994; U.S. Department of State 2000-2009). Farr (2008) might suggest Malawi's genuine respect for religious freedom represents the key distinction from the instability of Uganda. Thus, instead of contributing to terrorism and other acts of violent extremism, religious actors in Malawi instead participate frequently in interreligious dialogue and democratic activism.

For instance, in March 1992, with the private support of Pope John Paul II, a network of Roman Catholic bishops in Malawi openly challenged the regime of Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda in an effort to direct their nation towards a path of justice and freedom. For their first Lenten address that year, clerics in every church throughout Malawi read aloud from "Living Our Faith," a pastoral letter written by the bishops. "Living Our Faith" chastised the Banda

regime for its failings and abuses, and sparked a series of events that would lead to the emergence of multiparty elections in Malawi. First, however, the letter was deemed seditious, and the bishops—along with many others possessing copies of the document—were arrested. In spite of the government crackdown, several other churches eventually spoke out in support of the bishops, in the process establishing an interfaith organization, the Public Affairs Committee (PAC), comprised of Protestants, Catholics, and Muslims. PAC quickly became a leader in the fight for democratization by actively applying the pressure for multiparty elections to which the Banda regime would eventually acquiesce. To this day, the interfaith organization remains a watchdog for the democratic health of Malawian politics (Meredith 2005; Mitchell 2002; and Public Affairs Committee).

What explains the persistent violence of the LRA, or other terrorist organizations, like Al Shabaab in Somalia, while Malawi remains terrorism-free? Any number of contextual factors could be at play. As Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah (2011; hereinafter TPS) observe, the New Atheists (e.g., Harris 2004; Maher 2008) might be inclined to argue that religion is always and everywhere wired for violence, but the episode of regime change in Malawi illustrates that religious actors can also promote democratic development and interfaith dialogue. In other words, for every instance of religious violence one may cite (like the case of the LRA in Uganda), there are counter-examples of religious actors contributing positively to human social life. Groups like PAC in Malawi stand out as prime examples of interfaith dialogue, while other groups, such as the Community of Sant'Egidio, for instance, promote peaceful conflict resolution throughout the globe. In drawing attention to this ambivalence, Applebee (2000) recognizes that the task for scholars of religion and politics is to discern when and why violence may become tinged with religious fervor, while also identifying

the conditions under which religion may instead become associated with positive public goods, like interfaith dialogue or peaceful conflict resolution. Thus, the RFPT, with its emphasis on political context, fits best under the neo-Weberian rubric, rather than under the primordialist or instrumentalist approaches to religious violence.

Overview of What Follows

Bearing these concerns in mind, the argument unfolds as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature on terrorism and the clash of civilizations. Here, I also flesh out the so-called "diversity dividend," situating the phenomenon in the broader body of research on religious and ethnic diversity in IR. This is important because these two phenomena stand at odds. In the third chapter though, after I define religious freedom, I link the "diversity dividend" and the clash of civilizations to the RFPT, while demonstrating that this connection requires a more substantive theoretical underpinning than is presently offered in the literature. Consequently, I turn to Locke's (1667; 1689) contributions on tolerance in early modern Anglo-American political philosophy to explicitly integrate religious diversity into the RFPT. Chapter 4 discusses my research design, presents several hypotheses, and discusses my data. Here, I elaborate how exactly I employ data from both the RDWTI (2016) and GTD (Berkebile 2015; START 2016) to test the RFPT. Chapter 5 turns to the empirical analysis, and Chapter 6 concludes with a critical reflection on these findings. Here, I offer a metatheoretical contribution to the literature by problematizing the normative consequences and policy implications of the religious freedom research agenda. By relating the RFPTs possible policy consequences to Elizabeth Shakman Hurd's (2013; 2015) recent work on the subject, and critical scholarship on tolerance and the democratic peace thesis (DPT), I introduce an element of methodological pluralism like that discussed in Patrick T. Jackson's (2011) *Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations*. Finally, I

wrap the discussion in Chapter 6 up by turning to the limitations of the study, and implications for future research.

2 | The Clash of Civilizations and the Diversity Dividend

When Huntington (1993a; 1993b; 1996) proposed his "clash of civilizations" thesis, he suggested that outbreaks of political violence in the post-Cold War era would cluster around the fluid "fault-lines" of religious, ethnic, and linguistic identity existing both *within* and *between* civilizations. His macro-level assertions—that civilizational affinities would drive a wedge between nation-states from rival cultural groupings, leading to outbursts of conflict—have been thoroughly investigated, but remain largely unsubstantiated (Ellingsen 2000, Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006, Gurr 1994; and Henderson and Tucker 2001). Largely overshadowed by this debate on the clash of civilizations as a cause of war though, Huntington's frequent assertions about micro-level political violence—that adjacent sub-national groups will be enlisted into the fault-line struggles between competing civilizations—remain understudied. While some research examines the links between the clash and ethnic conflict on one hand, with civil war on the other (see, respectively, Fox 2002; and Henderson and Singer 2000), Huntington often asserts that the clash of civilizations manifests at the micro-level as a particular form of asymmetric conflict: terrorism.

The Clash of Civilizations and Domestic Terrorism

In his seminal *Foreign Affairs* article, "The Clash of Civilizations?," Huntington (1993a) writes of terrorism as a "weapon of the weak," used primarily by Muslims to compensate for asymmetric power imbalances in their civilizational conflict with the West. Terrorism is, he maintains, a form of quasi-warfare employed by Islamic militants in an effort to "exploit the open societies of the West" (Huntington 1996). Indeed, he specifically points to Arab and

Islamic supported terrorism—the bombings of planes, and seizing of hostages—and the Western imposition of sanctions on Libya after the bombing of Pan Am 103 as manifestations of the fault-line conflict between the West and Islam (Huntington 1993a: 31, 40). In a follow up article, Huntington (1993b) points to the first World Trade Center bombing, suggesting that the indictment of the Blind Sheik, Omar Abdel Rahman, and his followers for their roles in the attack also fits his "paradigm." Yet, terrorism isn't just a concern with the Muslim World. Huntington (1996: 212, 241) suggests that it also complicates relations between the West and Africa, so even the 1993 blacklisting of the Sudan as a terrorist state, he suggests, could be taken as further evidence of the clash of civilizations (Huntington 1993b).

Though a few studies examine this relationship indirectly (e.g., de Soysa and Nordås 2007; and Piazza 2009; also see Fox 2005) by looking at the link between terrorism and religion, particularly where Islam is concerned, Huntington's claims are often found wanting. To my knowledge, the only two studies that explicitly consider the relationship between the clash and terrorist violence yield similar conclusions (CFS, 2009; and Neumayer and Plümper 2009).[10] First, Eric Neumayer and Thomas Plümper (2009) pit the clash of civilizations against a strategic theory of international[11] terrorism. While they find evidence of greater cross-civilizational attacks emanating towards the West from the Islamic World, they conclude that, by providing material support to foreign governments, Western countries render themselves viable targets to local terror groups when the latter deem their governments corrupt or illegitimate (Neumayer and Plümper 2009: 733). Thus, what appears at first glance to be a clash of civilizations is better explained as strategic targeting.

Second, CFS compare the effects of four different causal mechanisms on both domestic and international terrorism in African and Asian states. Among other things, by examining the

effect of religious and ethnic diversity on the number of terrorist attacks that have occurred over the last four decades, they seek to determine if Huntington's clash could be driving a surge in political violence occurring throughout these disparate regions. Surprisingly, where they initially expected to find an increase in ethno-religious diversity to correlate with increased levels of terrorism, they instead find a "diversity dividend," suggesting that *states with more diverse ethno-religious demographics are less likely to suffer from incidents of terrorist violence*. While they concede that their findings contradict Huntington's expectations, CFS maintain that a clash of civilizations remains present under conditions of cultural homogeneity. They argue that the greatest numbers of terrorist attacks occur when a society is dominated by one or two ethnic or religious groups, possibly because groups that achieve social supremacy become capable of restricting the activities of minorities who respond in turn with violence (CFS 2009).

Additionally, the existence of the "diversity dividend" would not contradict Huntington's micro-level assertions if the clash of civilizations were only to manifest at a particular level of analysis, such as the transnational. Consequently, the diversity dividend might be driven by features unique to the domestic level of analysis. In their analysis of international terrorism, CFS (2009) adopt a monadic approach, which assumes that the characteristics of a state make it susceptible to terrorism inflows. Theoretically, this may be sensible when they consider regime type, but it becomes more challenging to understand why religious diversity would impact terrorism inflows.[12] By contrast, the strength of Neumayer's and Plümper's (2009) argument stems from their use of directed-dyad analysis (see Young and Findley 2011 for an explanation). With that said, however, Nuemayer and Plümper are theoretically indifferent to the subject of domestic terror. Though they agree with CFS that, globally, the majority of terrorist attacks are carried out against domestic targets by native assailants, they might see an attempt to test the

clash at the domestic level as meaningless. In other words, there may nothing special about finding a domestic diversity dividend that exists in tandem with the clash on a separate level of analysis because clashing civilizations simply do not exist at a domestic level of analysis. In fact, Nuemayer and Plümper argue that Huntington's thesis "make[s] no predictions about the extent of domestic terrorism" (722).

Yet, Huntington's thesis saves plenty of room for domestic conflict under the category of micro-level civilizational violence, which occurs when adjacent subnational groups along civilizational fault-lines vie for control of a given area. In "The Clash of Civilizations?," he points out that civilizational conflicts can occur between sub-national groups just as they might among states, and since civilizational boundaries actually overlap, there is no reason to think that conflict between different civilizational groups cannot break out with-in those states, especially where religion is concerned! Not only does religion form the primary basis for identity that unites Huntington's massive civilizations, it commonly transcends national borders. Just consider his discussion of Europe, where the continent's most significant fault-line is shown bisecting many countries—Belarus, Ukraine, Romania, Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro—throughout Eastern Europe. In Huntington's view, the division between the Protestant-Catholic West, and the Orthodox East opens many of these states to outbreaks of domestic violence (Huntington 1993a, 22-30).

As if that were not enough though, Huntington (1996: 207-208, 252) explicitly states that micro-level conflicts can occur between geographically proximate "groups from different civilizations *within a state*" (emphasis added). Furthermore, he points to racially motivated anti-Islamic policies that target migrants in places like France and Germany as evidence in support of his thesis. He refers to countries like these as a kind of "torn" country, where large numbers of

peoples of different civilizations can render them "candidates for dismemberment" (Huntington 1993a: 42). France and Germany may not be nearing this point, but Huntington does suggest that the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were prime examples, and he also holds up the U.S. as an instance of a country in trouble. Suggesting that states straddling civilizational fault-lines are at risk of an "internal clash," he points directly to immigration from Latin America, and policies of multiculturalism[13] as a real danger to American identity. He also highlights the clash between Muslims and Hindus in India. He notes that civil wars frequently break out along religious fault-lines, particularly in Africa where Christians and Muslims in Sudan, Chad, and Nigeria epitomize micro-level civilizational conflict, and finally, he offers the cases of the Balkans, Israel, Burma, and the Philippines as additional examples (Huntington 1993a: 32-35, 42; Huntington 1993b; also see Friedman 2009: 223-248; and Huntington 2004).

Nuemayer and Plümper (2009) aren't necessarily incorrect to suggest that Huntington offers no specific hypotheses about domestic terrorism, but with the above in mind, CFS (2009) are absolutely right to proceed with an understanding that his fault-lines can materialize *within* states as well as *between* them. And since civilizational conflict can produce outbreaks of terrorism, a real potential exists for micro-level civilizational differences to provoke incidents of *domestic* terrorism. Accordingly, CFS's (2009) monadic approach, flawed though it may be at the international level, seems a perfectly appropriate way to consider the effect of the clash on domestic terrorism, methodologically and theoretically. Of course, this makes their discovery of the diversity dividend more significant than it might otherwise have seemed if one were to assume that the clash of civilizations operates exclusively at a transnational level of analysis. So, if a clash is theoretically possible at the domestic level, does the discovery of a diversity dividend contradict Huntington's thesis? Possibly.

Ethnic and Religious Diversity and Political Violence

Though Cox (2015) urges caution about the generalizability of the diversity dividend, evidence of its existence has been observed before, across multiple levels of analysis in different areas of research dealing with religion and ethnicity alike, and using different sources of data. For instance, Donald Horowitz (1985) suggests that heterogeneity leads to reductions of ethnic violence. James Fearon and David Laitin (1996) assert that interethnic relations are more often characterized by peaceful interaction than violence, and they subsequently find neither ethnic nor religious diversity to be associated with civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Meanwhile, Indra de Soysa and Neumayer (2008) observe that cultural diversity is associated both with peaceful conflict resolution and reductions in defense spending. Evidence for the diversity dividend has also been observed in specific contexts. Where Matthias Basedau, et al. (2011) argue that religiously fractionalized African states are less prone to conflict, Hein Goemans and Kenneth Schultz (*forthcoming*) find the inverse: ethnic homogeneity is a significant predictor of territorial aggression in Africa. In fact, the diversity dividend has been observed so frequently that Robert Putnam (2007) points to "contact theory"—the idea that people overcome their ignorance of outsiders as they encounter them in everyday life—for one possible explanation

However, research on state-sponsored militancy (San-Akca 2009; Bapat 2011) reveals that ethnically fragmented states *are more likely* to sponsor violence against their enemies than homogenous states, suggesting that the diversity dividend does not extend into the realm of covert operations. This finding has not been linked explicitly to Huntington's thesis, but it is interesting, because he expects competing ethnic groups in rival states to call on their kinsmen for aid in times of strife (Huntington 1993a). Moreover, similar dynamics have been observed at play in Africa, which is significant given prior observations of the diversity dividend in African

conflicts (see Goemans and Schultz, *forthcoming*). Additionally, this offers reason to believe that the clash and diversity dividend may exist in tandem, increasing the need to elucidate the conditions under which each may manifest. If the diversity dividend has a mitigating effect on domestic and international terrorism as CFS suggest, perhaps future research can determine if the clash of civilizations exacerbates state-sponsored violence instead. To date, no direct test of this hypothesis has been carried out, but Zeev Maoz's and Belgin San-Akca's (2012) research on non-state armed groups further suggests that this may be the case since states are unlikely to sponsor non-state actors against the countries with which they share cultural affinities.

Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that several scholars do see the diversity dividend as a direct contradiction of Huntington's thesis. By way of illustration, Fearon and Laitin (2003: 75) suggest that the diversity dividend "runs contrary to a common view among journalists, policy makers, and academics, which holds 'plural' societies to be especially conflict prone due to ethnic or religious tensions and antagonisms." In other words, it challenges the conventional wisdom of primordialist theory. Similarly, Erik Gartzke and Kristian Gleditsch (2006) suggest that the diversity dividend turns the clash of civilizations thesis on its head—a strong claim given their argument that cultural differences should be viewed as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for warfare. Still, while their suggestion that scholars should explore why cultural differences often "coincide with peace" is a poignant one (Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006: 77), a conditional model of cultural violence need not stand at odds with Huntington's thesis. In fact, Huntington (1993a: 25) concedes that "[d]ifferences do not necessarily mean conflict, and [that] conflict does not necessarily mean violence"—a claim consistent with the expectations of social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) and other works on religion and violence (Seul 1999). Still, these findings present an interesting dilemma for the primordialist

expectations of the clash of civilizations thesis. How is the diversity dividend to be accounted for then?

Since scholars—Putnam (2007) excluded—are frequently surprised to find evidence of the diversity dividend, they usually only offer post-hoc ideas as possible explanations for their findings. As these explanations remain largely disconnected from one another, odds are good that they limn an incomplete theoretical explanation of the diversity dividend. For instance, Fearon and Latin (1996) postulate that in-group policing structures may help prevent the outbreak of inter-ethnic conflict, but what about out-group dynamics? For their part, while they maintain that a clash may be present under conditions of homogeneity, CFS (2009) reason that the peace dividend manifests under conditions of heterogeneity because it constitutes a de facto system of cultural checks and balances. It goes without saying that religious and ethnic diversity should not be confused, and though it is important to remember that these are distinct phenomena, CFS see a similar causal logic at work: this system of cultural checks and balances would make it too costly for one group—ethnic or religious—to abuse the rights of another in a diverse society since multiple minorities could act in concert to prevent such abuses. Consequently, they reason that heterogeneity fosters an "atmosphere of compromise" capable of inhibiting terrorism, while homogeneity must therefore foster the conditions of exploitation ripe for terrorism (CFS 2009: 62, 80). Still, this reveals little of the potential in-group dynamics at play in the decision to turn to or from terrorism. Finally, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2002), who claim that ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization all reduce the risk of civil war in Africa, suspect that rebel movements simply cannot maintain cohesion under conditions of cultural heterogeneity, but even this begs for further explanation in terms of in- as well as out-group dynamics.

The Diversity Dividend and the RFPT

Though the diversity dividend seems to contravene Huntington's thesis, the preceding discussion reinforces the need for a neo-Weberian approach that tries to understand the possible circumstances under which diversity may contribute to violent or non-violent political activity. Cox (2015) himself agrees, and he points to the RFPT as a possible explanation for the religious diversity dividend. He notes, for example, that the conflict between Catholics and Muslims in the Philippines is driven by grievances against *real* and *perceived* instances of religious intolerance. Interestingly, the diversity dividend thus parallels Farr's (2008) expectations; in fact, it can be directly subsumed by the RFPT. As Grim and Finke (2006: 6) highlight, state deregulation of religion "sharply increase[s] the supply and activity of religion" itself. Moreover, the idea that violence is ameliorated under conditions of heterogeneity when groups in a given social context become large enough to prevent moves by their competitors to stifle their freedoms is entirely consistent with a religious economy approach to terrorism (Iannaccone and Berman 2006), and the RFPT's Madisonian underpinnings. Contextualizing the diversity dividend in this way therefore helps Cox move beyond post-hoc explanations by adding theoretical depth and nuance to an otherwise insufficiently understood empirical regularity. Unfortunately though, the approach to the RFPT presently ascendant in academic discourse on religion and politics remains divorced from a rich tradition of Anglo-American political thought on the subject, which cripples its ability to understand the conditional effects of religious freedom on political violence. It is to this tradition that I now turn.

3 | Religious Toleration in Lockean Political Thought

The RFPT as advanced by Thomas Farr (2008) and others (e.g., Grim 2008; Grim and Finke 2007 and 2011; Muchlinski 2014; and TPS 2011) sees religious freedom an essential component to international and domestic tranquility. According to Farr (2008), the expansion of religious freedom throughout the world will increase political stability, resulting in a cascade of social benefits, including reductions in all forms of political violence. Religious freedom, that is, fosters democracy while increasing social capital, economic modernization, and several aspects of human development including literacy among women. Furthermore, as respect for religious freedom encourages governmental self-restraint, it becomes associated with a bundle of human rights, thus leading to a reduction in torture, rape, and unjust imprisonment. Finally, since religious persecution can trigger religious extremism, the development of religious freedom is believed to reduce religious violence and terrorism in particular (Cox 2015; Farr 2011; Grim 2008; Grim and Finke 2011; Muchlinski 2014). In this chapter, I explore the RFPT further by first considering what it means for a state to be religiously free, then by looking at the normative justifications for the RFPT, and finally, by exploring the implications of Locke's work on toleration for the religious freedom research agenda.

Religious Freedom Conceptualized

Since this thesis is primarily concerned with the relationship between religious freedom and terrorism, it is important to understand what these two concepts entail. Terrorism and domestic terror were, of course, defined in Chapter 1. I consider the meaning of religious freedom here though, starting with the way it is understood by Farr, perhaps the leading

proponent of the RFPT. Since his approach is normatively grounded in the works of the American "Founding Fathers," particularly James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, I then turn to the First Amendment. Finally, I reflect briefly on the place of religious tolerance and pluralism in the conceptualization of religious freedom, but this subject is the primary focus of Chapter 6, where it is further developed.[14]

For Farr (2008), religious liberty does several things. First, it allows individuals and groups to "embrace or reject" the obligations demanded of them upon entrance into a religious community, which means people are also free to exit such communities at will. Next, to guarantee their religious liberty, governments must refrain from attempts at coercing individuals and groups in theological matters. Additionally, these people should, in a normative sense, have a right to belief or disbelief. This freedom of conscience, as it might be described, is hinged on the presumed inviolability of the human mind. In other words, the human mind cannot (or at least should not) be made to believe things involuntarily. Consequently, the freedoms of religion and conscience together imply that people should have the right to live in accordance with the religious truths or principles espoused by their faith communities. Finally, Farr suggests that religious liberty entails a right to engage in public discourse to share one's faith with others in an effort to peacefully elicit their conversion, though he acknowledges the controversial place of proselytization in discussions of religious freedom abroad (Farr 2008, 22-25).

So defined, Farr (2008; 2010; 2011; 2013) believes the promotion of religious freedom by the U.S. government abroad can foster democracy, promote economic development, and "denude" societies of the contextual conditions that enable extremism. As such, Farr (2010, 2011; 2013) has been intensely critical of the Obama Administration's performance on international religious freedom issues, which he perceives as being sidelined by President

Obama, along with Secretaries of State Hillary Clinton and John Kerry, to concentrate on domestic policy priorities, like gay marriage—a word Farr (2013) accentuates with scare quotes. He views the Administration's actions, that is, as a deliberative attempt to abridge the freedom of religion as an extension of the president's allegedly arbitrary decision to promote other "rights" deemed comparable to or more important than religious freedom. So, when Secretary Clinton (2009) gave a speech on human rights that emphasized a freedom of *worship* and a right to *love* others in whatever way a person may choose, Farr (2013) was unimpressed. He laments that the "putative 'right to love'" clearly subordinates religious freedom to "same-sex 'marriage'" in the Administration's overall policy priorities.

The possibility that the freedom of conscience and Free Exercise Clause may work together to frame gay marriage as a right protected under the rubric of religious freedom (DeLaet and Caufield 2008) notwithstanding, Farr's (2013) more trenchant criticism demonstrates that an exclusive focus on worship (at the expense of religious freedom in general) demotes religious practice to a private activity by ignoring the "civic implications" of religious belief. While the debate over the proper place of religion in a liberal society persists (e.g., Neal 2014; Sweetman 2015), this clearly represents the same kind of public-private binary that feminist IR scholars (e.g., Sjoberg and Tickner 2012; Tickner 1992; 2009) have long discussed and decried for undermining human agency and knowledge claims lacking support in masculine experiences of the world. By eroding the agency of religious actors, policymakers (and scholars for that matter) contribute to a normative variant of the secularization thesis that ultimately seeks to eliminate religion in the public sphere rather than understand secularization as an empirical phenomenon (Dawson 2015; also see Herrington 2012).

Treating the freedom to worship *as* religious freedom rather than as a dimension *of* religious freedom thus stands at odds with Farr's more expansive understanding of religious freedom, which is rooted in Madison's work. The Framers of the American Bill of Rights, led by Madison, included two clauses in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution barring Congress from making any laws that infringe on religious liberty. The first, the "Establishment Clause," forbids the government from crafting laws that respect the "establishment of religion," meaning that the government cannot recognize a "national religion" on one hand, or that specific churches and religious movements cannot be excluded from the social fabric of American life by an act of the federal legislature on the other. Meanwhile, the second, or the "Free Exercise Clause," keeps Congress from "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion, effectively freeing all Americans to participate in any religious activity of their choosing. Framed as such, religious freedom seems to include the ability to practice one's faith collectively or individually without government interference. Such understandings are often proffered by organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union (2016), which contends that the First Amendment's protection of free exercise also extends to the right *not* to worship or the right to *dis*belief, while the Establishment Clause will proscribe preferential treatment to any sect; and yet, this still seems incomplete.

Madison might agree. The original language of what would eventually become the First Amendment contained stronger language when Madison first drafted the Bill of Rights. "The civil rights of none," Madison (1789) proposed,

> shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed (quoted in Labunski 2006).

What's more, Madison's proposal to protect religious freedom also extended to the states, while the First Amendment applied exclusively to the federal government until the Fourteenth was ratified in 1868. At any rate, the idea, as Farr and others (e.g., Gill 2008) might agree, was that people have a full suite of rights associated with the freedoms of conscience and religion, which may even be why this right comes packaged in the Constitution with other civil liberties, including the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble. Thus, while someone like Jefferson (1802) can write of a "wall of separation between Church [and] State" when describing the First Amendment, the fact that religious freedom entails an ability to *act* on one's beliefs precludes him or any other from discussing an impenetrable wall between *faith* and *politics*, the absence of which is precisely what gives rise to faith-inspired political action, like that epitomized by the Moral Majority.

Properly understood, this means that religious freedom *is not synonymous with secularism*, though the two are almost certainly related. As Hurd (2008) observes, secularism typically comes in two varieties. The first, laicism, treats religion as an adversary to modern politics and tries to force it from the public sphere. The second, Judeo-Christian secularism, sees religion as the basis of group identity and social unity. Each logically leads to a distinct take on religious freedom. Where the former would drive religious practice into the private sphere, the latter would consciously encourage its public expression. The U.S. may fall more in line with the Juedo-Christian expression of secularism, but the notion of religious freedom articulated by Madison and Jefferson actually hints at a third way: pluralism.

As James A. Beckford (2014) observes, pluralism is often mistaken for diversity, an empirically observable social condition defined by the presence of different people. Religious diversity might thus be measured by counting the number of religious groups present in a

country. By contrast, religious pluralism, like religious exclusivism and inclusivism, is actually a normative response to diversity that may adhere to different worldviews, philosophies, and theological systems. Pluralism can go as far as assuming that different religions are essentially equal in their truth content, meaning that they should be treated alike without assuming one is inherently better than another (Dueck 2013). A more conservative approach to pluralism simply underscores "the positive value of religious diversity in itself," by promoting religious diversity as "a means to the attainment of social and cultural cohesion and harmony" (Beckford 2014, 22). By contrast, religious exclusivism, which assumes the supremacy of one religion over all others, views diversity as threatening, while inclusivism, which recognizes the supremacy of one religion, tries to *tolerate* heterogeneity (Dueck 2013).

Evidence of Madison's pluralist worldview stems from several sources, including his *Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments* (1785), as well as *Federalist 10* (1787) and *Federalist 51* (1788). Although he played an important role in the articulation of Article XVI of *The Virginia Declaration of Rights* in 1776, the protection of religious freedom therein privileges Christianity. By the mid- to late-1880s however, when he would author the *Memorial and Remonstrance* and contribute to the *Federalists,* Madison had come to recognize the value of diversity in Virginia. He had seen a multiplicity of religious sects give rise to political stability by preventing one "faction" from overcoming another (Arkin 1995). Accordingly, Madison (1785) argued that religious taxes would undermine religious moderation and social harmony by privileging the Episcopal Church at the expense of all others. He built on this argument further in his treatise on faction, suggesting that freedom is the key to mitigating the conflict produced by diverse special interests, political parties, and religious sects. The greater the number of parties, Madison reasoned, the smaller the probability that one could

invade the rights of another. Indeed, he argued that the emergence of one dangerous religious sect could be kept in check by "the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of [the nation]" (Madison 1787), laying the ground work for what CFS (2009) might recognize in *Federalist 51* as a *de facto* system of cultural checks and balances.

Of course, *Federalist 51* is primarily concerned with the legal system of checks and balances that keeps the three branches of the federal government in balance by protecting each from the other. Yet, Madison's pluralist worldview still creeps in:

> Whilst all authority in [the United States] will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority (Madison 1788).

At first blush, the implications of this argument for religious freedom may not be apparent, but when combined with his arguments from *Federalist 10* and the *Memorial and Remonstrance,* it is evident that Madison has recognized the value of human diversity and the role it plays in building a stable society. The link is made more explicit when he adds that "security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights" because the former recognizes a multiplicity of interests while the latter defers to a multiplicity of sects. This system of cultural checks and balances, that is, can prevent a majority from harming the will of a minority most of the time, in Madison's formulation, because any coalition of "interests, parties, and sects" large enough to do so could only rarely emerge (Madison 1788).

One of the novel features of Madison's pluralism is that it reached beyond the kinds of religious tolerance practiced by religious inclusivists attempting to cope with religious diversity in the aftermath of the Protestant Reformation. Religious tolerance is discussed at length later, but it is important to note that Madison viewed religious freedom as a distinct approach to

diversity. Tolerance, as the political tolerance literature makes clear, can be "[d]efined as the willingness *to put up* with groups or ideas one finds objectionable" while resisting the urge to repress the proponents of said ideas (Peffley, et al., 2016; emphasis added). When the colonial assembly of Maryland passed *An Act Concerning Religion* in 1649, Maryland became one of the world's first political entities to extend religious tolerance to nonconformists by guaranteeing the "free exercise" of religion in "matters of conscience." However, the regime articulated under the act was one built on an inclusivist notion of tolerance, limiting religious freedom to Christian sects (including Catholics), but enforcing tolerance among the public at-large by proscribing insults aimed at members of rival sects while enumerating harsh penalties for blasphemy. Instead, in Madison's vision of American society, "[t]he right of every man is to liberty—not tolerance" (quoted in Arkin 1995), meaning religious groups could actively participate in social life entirely free from government interference.

With this in mind, religious freedom is—for Madison, like Farr—a broad notion meant not only to protect the private freedom of conscience and its private expression in worship, but also the religious actor's ability to publically act on all concordant beliefs. In this sense, one might suggest that religious freedom exists on a spectrum (TPS 2011), and that the protection of religious liberty on the spectrum involves a litany of policies touching on a diverse range of issues from education, to land-use, and expression (Gill 2008). As Anthony Gill (2008) maintains, it's not an either/or proposition as the legal articulation of a religious freedom policy in a country's constitution may otherwise suggest. It therefore entails an ongoing project to negotiate and renegotiate the legitimate bounds of religious agency in public life across issue-areas, which is why countries that lack a pluralist vision of religious freedom can include

provisions affirming free exercise while failing to respect religious liberty in practice (see Chapter 6).

Indeed, constitutions from around the globe often contain some kind of religious freedom clause, but attempts to legislate on matters of religion are ubiquitous, even among states formally establishing a separation between religion and state (Fox 2011). Additionally, where religious freedom clauses are indicative of the government's commitment to religious liberty, they are similarly poor measures of religious tolerance among members of the society at-large, ultimately rendering it necessary to distinguish between religious freedom in formal law (*de jure* religious liberty), religious freedom in practice (*de facto* religious liberty), and social tolerance of religious diversity. Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke (2006) address the notion of socially regulated religion, but the issue is beyond the scope of this thesis. Jonathan Fox's (2011) work on constitution clauses deals with *de jure* religious liberty, but this phenomenon is likewise beyond the scope of the present analysis. My discussions of religious freedom ahead thus concentrate on the actual behavior of states rather than the place of religious liberty in formal law. Suffice it to say, religious liberty in either sense though, refers to a package of interrelated freedoms guaranteeing individuals and groups the ability to freely exercise their religions in accordance with their beliefs. Operationalizing religious freedom according to this definition presents some minor issues, but I will return to this subject ahead of the empirical analysis in the next chapter.

The Normative Justification for the RFPT

With the foregoing in mind, Farr often cites the place of religious liberty in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as the normative justification behind the RFPT. Though religious freedom entails a cluster of rights, he typically describes the freedoms of religion and conscience as the "first freedoms," even invoking the founding generation's apparent belief that

religion was "crucial for the health of democracy" (Farr 2013: 39). Accordingly, he sees the freedom of conscience as the right to pursue religious truths free from coercion, while religious freedom grants people the rights to live in accordance with those truths (2008: 22-23). Morally, Farr (2010) insists that the U.S. has a duty to promote religious freedom abroad because, ingrained into its identity since the time of its founding is a belief that violations of conscience constitute an injustice against human dignity. Practically, however, he contends that the failure to grant these freedoms inspires disaffected minorities to violence. Hence the reason he advocates greater emphasis for these freedoms in the U.S.'s counterterrorism policy and national security strategy. Consequently, there is no doubt that Farr was pleased with the ascension of these so-called "first freedoms" to the status of foreign policy priority when Congress passed the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) in 1998. Unfortunately though, he has grown largely frustrated with the State Department's lethargic implementation of the law, so he continues to invoke the likes of Madison and Jefferson in his efforts to further raise the profile of religious freedom in American foreign policy circles (Farr 2008; 2010; 2011; 2013).

Meanwhile, Grim and Finke (2011) similarly point to the example of the U.S. and its founding fathers. They suggest that Madison and Jefferson internalized lessons taught previously by the likes of Voltaire, David Hume, and Adam Smith, when they first started promoting religious freedom to their peers in the colonies and states as a tool to ameliorate social and religious conflict. Of course, Madison did borrow from Smith who in turn borrowed from Hume, but the founder also drew on Locke. As noted in *Federalists 10* and *51*, religious freedom is about fostering the stability of the state, a sentiment consistent with Locke's views. Of course, Madison also recognized that religious freedom was key to the proliferation of sects and factions, and he saw, like Smith (1776; also see Iannaccone and Berman 2006), that diversity

was as important to regime stability as religious freedom, since the former discouraged fanaticism and encouraged moderation in the processes of winning converts in the context of a religious market or religious economy (Arkin 1995; Iannaccone and Berman 2006; Madison 1787 and 1788; Smith 1776; and Zagorin 2003).

TPS (2011: 44) also agree that the church-state relationship plays an important role in shaping the behaviors of religious actors. They argue that where states have conflictual relationships with religious groups, the latter will be prone to committing acts of terrorism, while religious actors living in regimes with U.S.-style religious freedom—a church-state relationship characterized by consensual independence—will be likely to promote peaceful conflict mediation. With the exception of Grim's and Finke's brief overview of Enlightenment era works on religious freedom by Voltaire, Hume, and Smith, the problem with these approaches is that they present religious freedom as if it were a uniquely American phenomenon, subject to export for security purposes.[15] Neither Farr (2008), nor Grim and Finke (2011), nor TPS (2011) make any reference to the classical works on religious toleration by such thinkers as William Penn (1670) and John Locke (1667; 1689), each of whom was writing well before Voltaire, Hume, and Smith. Even Anthony Gill's (2008) seminal contribution on *The Political Origins of Religious Liberty* only briefly references Locke, his status as one of the most important thinkers on religious toleration in the 17th century, his contribution to the doctrine of separation of church and state, and his influence on later thinkers like Madison and Jefferson notwithstanding (Cox 1982; Snyder 1988; Zagorin 2003).

Though this research has clearly evolved in unique ways, overlooking the contributions of thinkers like Locke and Penn, divorces it from a rich Anglo-American philosophical and historical tradition of tolerationist writings. While still inherently Western, a more sophisticated

understanding of Enlightenment political philosophy—Locke's work in particular, but also with reference to thinkers like Smith and Madison—can add layers of nuance to debates over the relationships between religion, violence, and instability. This matters for two reasons. First, as scholars like Farr promote religious freedom as a one-size-fits-all solution for the world's political problems abroad, they often overlook the specific social and historical circumstances that fostered the Anglo-American tradition of religious freedom in the first place, giving rise to issues of empirical generalizability. Ever the empiricist, Locke stands poised to rectify this issue though, as he was intimately acquainted with the realities of his day (Cox 1982).

Second, while the existence of the diversity dividend can be accounted for by modern research on religious freedom and cultural fractionalization, and while its existence seems to be irreconcilable with the expectations of the clash of civilizations thesis, incorporating Locke's ideas into current theories of religious freedom can help them account for both! Recall Gartzke and Gleditsch's (2006) assertion that cultural distinctions provide a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for conflict. If the effects of religion or religious identity are conditioned by a regime's church-state relationship (TPS 2011), the diversity dividend may not contravene Huntington's thesis at all. Put another way, religious actors may behave differently in states that guarantee their religious freedom than they might in states that constrict their liberties, meaning that the diversity dividend and the clash of civilizations might both exist, perhaps even at the same time, just under distinct conditions. By emphasizing Locke's work, scholars can better elucidate his contributions to the theory of religious freedom, ultimately leading to a better appreciation of the conditionality of this relationship.

Towards a Neo-Lockean RFPT

With the publication of *A Letter Concerning Toleration* in 1689, Locke joined a chorus of Western political philosophers responsible for articulating the normative principles of religious freedom that would ultimately undergird the modern separation of church and state. His ideas, however, were clearly shaped by the times. Born in 1632, Locke matured in the aftermath of the Reformation, which would break the hegemony of the Roman Catholic Church, sowing the seeds of schism, heresy, and religious innovation throughout Northern Europe and England. Having experienced the English Civil War throughout his teenage years, he would turn 16 as the tumultuous religious conflicts of continental Europe would reach their climax at Westphalia. As an adult, he would live through Oliver Cromwell's commonwealth and the Glorious Revolution (Cox1982). He would have seen the wars of religion that followed the Reformation fail to restore any semblance of theological unity, and he would have watched the resulting flowering of religious diversity with keen eyes, as dissident religious groups would proliferate throughout Europe. Locke also observed the radicalization of religious nonconformists in the face of political persecution, as Calvinists, Presbyterians, Quakers, and even Catholics, *inter alia*, would grow dissatisfied with the regime's harsh treatment of religious minorities, contributing to the outbreak of the civil war in 1642 (Gill 2008).

Resultantly, Locke initially came to see religious toleration as an excuse to promote perpetual disorder, which is why he suggests, in his *Two Tracts on Government* (1660; 1661), that people agreeing to live under the rule of a magistrate waive their religious freedoms for the sake of security (Zagorin 2003). His position gradually changed over the next few years however. In his *Essay Concerning Toleration* (1667), he articulates an embryonic version of the church-state doctrine when he asserts that the magistrate should have nothing to do with his private interests in the realm of religion. Extending this right to worship freely even, if

tentatively, to Catholics,[16] Locke argues further that policies of religious conformity actually exacerbate religious tensions:

> Nor does this injunction at all conduce to the peace or security of the government but quite the contrary, because hereby the magistrate does not make any one to be one jot the more of his minde [*sic*], but to be very much more his enemy" (Locke 1667: 278).

The point was that disciplining nonconformity would likely result in the very violence it sought to curtail (Snyder 1988), a contention supported by modern research connecting religious discrimination to violent dissent (Akbaba and Taydas 2011; Fox 2004; Gurr 1993, 2000), and claims that grievances undergird modern terrorism (Crenshaw 1981). Illustrating a full about-face from his original position outlined in the *Two Tracts* (Locke 1660, 1661) then, Locke avers that toleration is the key to countering faction under conditions of religious heterogeneity when he suggests that the persecution of religious nonconformists will unite dissidents against the government. Thus, while the magistrate does in fact retain some power over religion as it relates to security, Locke ultimately limits the government's role to the maintenance of men's comfort, not their immortal souls (Locke 1667).

Developing both a theological and practical political approach to justifying toleration, Locke's arguments become more nuanced in his *Letter* (1689). Instrumentalist scholars like Gill (2008) overlook these nuances though, as they generally downplay the ideational factors that played a role in the emergence of religious freedom in Early Modern England. On one hand, Gill persuasively asserts that decision makers tend to grant religious liberty for strategic reasons, as when Parliament passed the Toleration Act in 1688. But Locke would agree, as evidenced both by the *Letter* and his *Essay* (1667)! Toleration, in his mind, promotes regime stability. Yet, as Locke argues, there are both strategic *and* ideational interests at stake in the debate over

religious nonconformity. Of course, this matters for two reasons. First, the debate taking place between him and his contemporaries—including people like Penn—likely helped frame Parliament's policy options in the first place.

Second, the theological argument in Locke's *Letter* sheds light on the normative foundation of religious liberty today, because it was used to foster public support for tolerationist sentiments, while also mandating international reciprocity. Although it hinges on Protestant-centric notions of "true" religion, the epistemological lucidity of Locke's theological argument is quite compelling. After adopting a kind of methodological agnosticism (Snyder 1988; also see Bell and Taylor 2014), he reasons that mankind cannot possess knowledge of "true" religion, meaning the magistrate cannot possess knowledge of "true" religion. Consequently, the government can only impose its will in religious matters by jeopardizing the souls of its subjects, for the imposition of the magistrate's will can only, therefore, represent the imposition of his or her *opinion*. Thus, using state resources to impose conformity in religious matters would hinder the growth of "true" religion, because, as Locke trenchantly observes, few if any of the foreign rulers throughout Early Modern Europe held the same religious beliefs in the post-Westphalian era. In other words, trying to compel orthodoxy could have the unintended consequence of persecuting the "true" religion in most countries (Snyder 1988).

Though the foreign princes of the European mainland, particularly in Germany, assumed the right to establish and enforce a state religion within their respective territories when the Peace of Westphalia (1648) produced the principle of *cuius regio, euis religio* (Philpott 2000; Nexon 2009; Lynch 2014), Locke's call for toleration challenged such notions of sovereignty in religious matters by "demonstrating that the consequences of intoleration are undesirable for the propagation of true religion" (Snyder 1988). Though the *cuius regio, euis religio* principle only

sought to legitimize diversity in religion at the international level, Locke understood that the Reformation created the conditions for diversity at multiple levels throughout society. Although every prince believed his was the "true" religion, their diversity of beliefs guaranteed that at least some were persecuting believers of the "true" religion since compulsion occurred in many countries throughout the world (Locke 1689: 28). The risk to "true" religion was thus too dangerous for Locke to take contemporary norms of sovereignty seriously:

> In the variety and contradiction of Opinions in Religion, wherein the Princes of the World are as much divided as in their Secular Interests, the narrow way would be much strained. One Country alone would be in the right, and all the rest of the World would be put under an Obligation of following their Princes in the ways that lead to Destruction (Locke 1689: 15).

Given that no mortal could ever hope to identify the "true" religion, protecting the "true" religion therefore necessitated toleration of religious diversity and mutual reciprocity. That is, protecting Anglicans in Germany, for example, mandates that Lutherans be protected in England (Locke 1689: 59). The only religions Locke refuses to grant toleration to, namely, Roman Catholicism, are those that themselves refuse to extend tolerance on a reciprocal basis (Locke 1689: 51). Though Catholic governments had been known to promote religious toleration elsewhere in the world in the early modern period,[17] it is here that Locke's anti-Catholic bias seems to overpower any real concerns he has about persecuting the "true" religion, but such issues can be discussed at another time.

4 | Research Design

By synthesizing the Lockean tradition of toleration with modern research on religious freedom and political violence, a clearer causal picture comes into view. Since Huntington expects competing identities to contribute to conflict, CFS are right to predict that more diversity could lead to greater incidents of terrorist violence. Their discovery of a diversity dividend, however, is more in line with modern research on religious freedom, which theorizes that religious liberty guarantees should be correlated with reduced incidents of political violence. The Lockean tradition of toleration, however, has the potential to account for Huntington's expectations, and CFS's actual findings, as Locke points to the role of religious freedom as an intervening variable in a chain of causality that links diversity to political violence. This means that while diversity might be a necessary condition for conflict, it is incapable of sparking violence on its own. Locke, and others (e.g. TPS 2011), might thus posit the church-state relationship as the factor needed to ignite a putative "clash of civilizations." As summarized in



Figure 2. Summary of the Neo-Lockean model.

Figure 2, the intolerance and discrimination associated with religious regulation are thus needed to bring about conflict under conditions of heterogeneity, while cultural heterogeneity under conditions of religious freedom should instead be associated with reduced levels of conflict.[18]

Hypotheses

Several hypotheses can be derived from this approach. First, it is important to note that because Locke was writing under the conditions of a pre-existing diversity resulting from the Reformation, he is agnostic to the effect of religious freedom on violence under conditions of homogeneity. Therefore, the model also remains agnostic to the effect of homogeneity on terrorism. Insofar as the diversity dividend is concerned though, heterogeneity should reduce the occurrence of political violence, independent of the effect of religious freedom. This would be consistent with CFS's findings, and it would also be expected by the religious economy approach favored by scholars like Gill (2008) and others (see Iannaccone and Berman 2006; Madison 1787, 1788; and Smith 1776: 846-875).[19] Since the clash of civilizations thesis might lead some scholars (see CFS 2009) to believe the opposite however, I also hypothesize the inverse:

H_{1A}: Increased levels of diversity will result in reductions in the occurrence and level of terrorist violence.

H_{1B}: Increased levels of diversity will result in increases in the occurrence and level of terrorist violence.

Given that modern religious freedom theorists (e.g. Farr 2008) all predict that religious freedom will lead to reductions in political violence, and increases in regime stability independent of diversity, I also hypothesize the following:

H_2: The presence of religious freedom will result in reductions in the occurrence and level of terrorist violence.

However, Locke sees religious freedom as the key to reducing violence under conditions of religious heterogeneity, while TPS (2011) suggest that the church-state relationship may

condition the behavior of religious actors. Thus, to account for the possibility that the clash of civilizations may exist alongside the diversity dividend, I also need to consider the role of religious freedom as an intervening variable. As such, I expect diversity to promote violence under conditions of religious non-freedom, while I expect diversity to promote reductions in violence for states with religious freedom:

H_{3A}: Diversity under conditions of religious freedom will result in reductions in the occurrence and level of terrorist violence.

H_{3B}: Diversity under conditions of religious non-freedom will result in increases in the occurrence and level of terrorist violence.

Case Selection

To test these hypotheses, I collect data from 93 countries in Asia and Africa with populations of 1 million or more over a ten year period from 2000-2009. Since the country-year is my unit of analysis, this yields 928 observations.[20] With that said, I am sensitive to the neocolonial implications of analyzing the RFPT in an exclusively non-Western context. Of course, this is a subject to which I return in Chapter 6, but it is important to recognize that the RFPT, including its neo-Lockean variant,[21] is an approach articulated primarily by Westerners, as is the clash of civilizations thesis. Locke, an early modern Englishman, Huntington, an American, and most of the religious freedom researchers referenced above are white, Western men. Additionally, as noted below, the data on religious freedom is drawn from a Western source—the U.S. State Department. Finally, the very concept of religious freedom is itself largely regarded as a Western construct, something Huntington (1993a) even acknowledges. As he asserts, this is important because

> Western concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in other civilizations. Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often

> have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist, or Orthodox cultures. Western efforts to propagate such ideas produce instead a reaction against 'human rights imperialism' and a reaffirmation of indigenous values, as can be seen in the support for religious fundamentalism by the younger generation in non-Western cultures (Huntington 1993a).

Nevertheless, I intentionally conduct my analysis using data drawn from the non-Western world for a few reasons.

First, Farr (2011, 2013) and others often dismiss criticisms of cultural imperialism out of hand, but it's worth noting that before IRFA was passed, many critics accused the faith-based coalition of right-leaning groups behind the legislation of using it specifically to "[clear] the way for missionaries" in countries previously unwilling to open their boarders to Western proselytists (Farr 2008: 115). Since such missionaries are specifically interested in the 10/40 window, a concept coined by Luis Bush (1989) to describe the belt of Asian and African states between the 10^{th} and 40^{th} north latitude where Christians make up an often oppressed minority (Hoover 2009), it's worth asking if the RFPT—a Western construct—actually applies in a non-Western context. Testing the RFPT in the context of Asia and Africa could therefore provide strong support for the religious freedom research agenda; if not, perhaps there is something to the claim that missionaries represent the harbingers of cultural imperialism (Herrington 2012; 2013), but more on this later.

Second, this study builds on earlier work by CFS (2009) that focuses exclusively on Asia and Africa. Since it represents an attempt to empirically evaluate Cox's (2015) suggestion that the RFPT may explain the diversity dividend, I concentrate on the same regions as he and his colleagues. This study offers several advances over their work though, the first of which is to include the states of the Middle East. At the time of their writing, CFS (2009: 4) believed the Middle East was over-represented in the terrorism literature, and that Asia and Africa had been

dangerously understudied. However, their analysis includes the culturally similar North African states, which seems a little puzzling. The addition of the Middle East here, allows for a more thorough comparison of terrorism between regions by avoiding the truncation of the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) states. Like CFS (2009) though, I exclude the 11 states of Asia and Africa with a population that does not exceed 1 million (see the Appendix for a list).

Since one of my goals is to determine if religious freedom can help inoculate a state against domestic terrorism, my use of the country-year as the unit of observation also follows CFS's example. This particular approach is useful for examining the factors that make a state vulnerable to experiencing a terrorist attack. My temporal focus on the period from 2000-2009 represents a departure from their earlier work though. In their analysis of domestic terrorism, CFS (2009) relied on data from the MIPT-TKB, which means they only had six years of available information drawn from the period 1998-2003. My analysis starts in 2000 because that is the earliest year for which religious freedom data is available from the State Department (2000-2009), and ends in 2009 because that is the latest year for which terrorism data is available from the RDWTI (2016).

Data

I use data from both the RDWTI (2016) and the GTD (Berkebile 2015; START 2016) to test the relationship between domestic terrorism and the RFPT. Though the START (2016) dataset technically offers a more comprehensive range of available information than the RDWTI, I accept the limitations of the latter for the GTD primarily for the sake of comparison. This is important since the RDWTI's estimates are more conservative. Of course, since I follow CFS (2009), the RDWTI is also a useful tool because it is the official successor to the MIPT-TKB.[22] Importantly though, the RDWTI does not provide the ability to easily distinguish between terror

attacks based on the identities of the attackers and perpetrators as required by the definition articulated in Chapter 1 (Berkebile 2015). This represents a distinct advantage in the GTD, but because the GTD is known to contain "some inaccurate, incomplete, and inconsistent coding that cannot be easily ignored," I turn to Richard E. Berkebile's (2015: 4) modified version of the GTD, which was explicitly built as domestic terrorism database. Furthermore, his dataset makes it easy to distinguish between state and non-state victims of domestic terror attacks, and as such, the former are altogether eliminated from the universe, making the GTD data more compatible with the definition articulated in Chapter 1. Berkebile's modified version of the GTD also makes information on the religious ideology of the attackers available making it theoretically possible to distinguish between religious and non-religious terror attacks. For reasons outlined in Chapter 1, differentiating the two would be ideal for this study. However, practical concerns resulting from the shift in the unit of analysis have required that this be delayed for the foreseeable future. Instead, the analysis is conducted against the whole universe of remaining cases, with one silver lining remaining: since the RDWTI does not include the ability to easily distinguish cases by religious ideology, I can take an identical approach to the analysis of both datasets.

In any event, I subject the hypotheses articulated above to a battery of statistical analyses using both datasets. This should not be mistaken for an attempt to mine the data in search for statistical significance though. Rather, I employ three dependent variables (DVs) and as such, my analysis proceeds in three phases. Since I examine four models using both datasets throughout each phase, this produces a total of 24 statistical models, making mine a relatively exhaustive analysis of the RFPT.

Descriptive statistics for the DVs and the remaining variables are summarized in Figure 3 and Table 1. Large scale attacks occur on a relatively infrequent basis, so the preliminary phase



Figure 3. Distribution of dichotomized DVs, *Religious Freedom*, and *Religious Diversity*.

of my analysis evaluates the impact of diversity and religious freedom on the *occurrence* rather than the *rate* of terrorism. Accordingly, I use a dichotomous variable, *Attacks (Dichotomized)*, set equal to 1 to indicate whether or not a terrorist attack occurred in a given state. Given the binary nature of this DV, the analysis begins with a series of logit models in lieu of the basic OLS approach employed by CFS (2009).[23] Second, I use a count of the total number of terrorist attacks, *Attacks (Total)*, experienced by a state in a given year to determine if either religious freedom or diversity helps to ameliorate the *rate* of terrorism. Finally, since terrorist violence is also frequently measured in the literature by the number of casualties resulting from a terror attack (e.g., Piazza 2009; Klein 2015), and since groups are expected to moderate in the presence of diversity, the third DV, *Casualties*, measures the total number of people killed or injured in domestic attacks each year. To help account for extreme values in the data, both *Attacks (Total)* and *Casualties* are analyzed using a negative binomial model.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	Missing
Religious Diversity	928	4.245	2.123	1	19	0
Ethnicity	928	5.501	6.799	0	47	0
Democracy	897	0.433	6.139	-10	10	31
GDPpcPPP (log)	928	7.892	1.077	5.298	10.958	0
Population (log)	928	16.403	1.485	8.902	21.0149	0
Land Area (log)	928	12.408	1.774	6.458	16.658	0
Attacks (RDWTI)	918	27.389	186.762	0	3968	10
Casualties (RDWTI)	918	161.854	1330.043	0	24796	10
Attacks (GTD)	928	14.214	63.342	0	909	0
Casualties (GTD)	928	127.885	759.453	0	14469	0

There are two main independent variables that are analyzed in each of these models. A state's religious diversity, *Religious Diversity*, is measured using a count variable based on information collected from the CIA's (2000-2009) *World Factbook*. CFS (2009) count only those religions that comprise at least 10% of a state's population, but I count all religions because the CIA does not report demographic statistics on many states in Asia. Coding details are outlined in the Appendix. Next, a separate variable is needed to operationalize the presence of religious freedom in a state. For that reason, I draw on the U.S. Department of State's (2000-2009) *Annual Report on International Religious Freedom*, which has been shown to be among the most comprehensive and reliable sources of such data (Grim and Finke 2006), to code a dichotomous variable set equal to 1 if the state is said to be religiously free (and 0 if it is not). The either/or approach entailed by my use of a dichotomous variable could represent a shortcoming, as elaborated in Chapter 3, but this coding is based primarily on the either/or approach adopted by the State Department in the issuance of its religious freedom reports

(deviations are detailed in the Appendix), and it is useful in determining whether or not a state actually respects religious freedom in a *de facto* sense. Finally, I include an interaction term to help address the third hypothesis.

Next, CFS (2009) relied exclusively on a series of univariate models, which thus lacked a number of possible controls even though several are needed. First, it is necessary to control for democracy. What little relationship CFS (2009) actually observe between democracy and domestic terrorism seems to indicate that democracies will increase the terrorism rate. This would suggest that autocracies are less likely to experience terrorist attacks (Hamilton and Hamilton 1983). Yet, in his study of repression and domestic terrorism, James A. Piazza (2015a) shows that government repression designed to increase the cost of terrorism fails as an effective counterterrorism policy, while repression designed to quell legitimate dissent actually increases domestic terrorism. This makes it difficult to anticipate the effect of the control, but it is necessary as regime type has been commonly put forward as a possible predictor for both transnational (Blomberg and Hess 2005; Gelpi and Avdan 2015; Piazza 2008; Weinberg and Eubank 1998) and domestic terrorism (Ash 2016). I therefore account for the presence of democracy by including a state's Polity IV *POLITY2* democracy score (Marshall and Gurr 2014).

With that said, Ghatak (2014) finds that a failure to consolidate democratic institutions can contribute to terrorism, which is similar to findings from the transnational literature on anocracy and regime instability (CFS 2009). As noted in Chapter 1, work on religious freedom and hate crimes has also emphasized the importance of anocracy (Muchlinski 2014). As such, I include a square term that can help account for a curvilinear relationship by identifying the effect of anocracy—transitioning regimes located at the midrange of the Polity scale. Konstantin Ash (2016) argues that the prohibitive cost of insurgency in a stable democracy causes disaffected

groups to turn to terrorism. However, he suggests that such states are also better equipped to counter the threat these groups represent, so Ash finds that the terror campaigns experienced by anocracies and autocracies are both more intense and longer. While I cannot meaningfully account for temporal variation in the present research design, this may indicate that terror campaigns in autocratic and anocratic states will be more violent, producing more casualties than in their democratic counterparts.

With this in mind, it might thus make sense to include James Raymond Vreeland's (2008) *X-POLITY* measure of democracy. Polity IV's democracy scores are based on an index that includes an "explicit reference to civil war in [its] coding rules" (Vreeland 2008: 402), which has obviously been problematic for studies of civil war that rely on anocracy as an important predictor. Hence, Vreeland's *X-POLITY* is calculated without reference to civil war. While this may represent a path for future research, the original variable's reference is to civil war, not terrorism. Furthermore, anocracies are often associated with instability, and though Vreeland (2008) explicitly links this to the inclusion of civil war in the index, this instability-laden anocracy measure is welcome in the present study. Since CFS's (2009) replication data is no longer available, their measure of instability is also unavailable. Yet they specifically link regime instability and interruptions to the political violence associated with a regime's transition from autocracy to democracy. In their own words,

> the transition period to democratic governance is asserted by several prominent scholars to be one of the most unstable and tenuous periods a state can experience (CFS 2009: 34).

Said simply, CFS conceptualize instability in a way that links it intimately to anocracy, and as such, inclusion of the original Polity IV data can allow the quadratic term to proxy for regime instability.

Second, since the condition of a state's economy has previously been considered important (Ghatak and Gold 2015; Haleem 2005), I follow CFS (2009) by controlling for a state's wealth through the inclusion of its per capita Gross Domestic Product (set to Purchasing Power Parity) as recorded by the CIA (2000-2009). Unfortunately, I do not include a measure of income inequality, which CFS (2009) specifically use to assess Irm Haleem's notion of a "poverty-terrorism nexus." Data on income inequality is hard to come by though, as reliable time-series information on a state's GINI coefficient, the most commonly used measure of income inequality, is sparsely available for most of the states in Asia and Africa. This introduces a mild risk of omitted variable bias into the analysis, but I believe it is an acceptable risk given that research on poverty and terrorism generally dismisses the rooted-in-poverty thesis or yields inconclusive results (Abadie 2006; CFS 2009; Krueger 2007; Piazza 2006).

Third, I code for the number of politically relevant ethnic groups using Andreas Wimmer, et al.'s (2009) "Ethnic Power Relations" (EPR) dataset. CFS attempt to proxy for political relevance by using the CIA's *World Factbook* to estimate the total number of ethnic groups that exceed 10% of a state's total population, but as they acknowledge, this 10% cut-off serves as an arbitrary measure of relevance. This is an important consideration though, because CFS find evidence of the diversity dividend in their analysis of ethnicity. Now, while a similar causal logic may drive the diversity dividend in regards to both ethnic and religious diversity (see Chapter 2), one cannot assume *a priori* that they will have a similar impact since they are conceptually distinct phenomena, distinguished primarily by the fact that a person can change their religion in a diverse ideational marketplace. The same cannot be said for ethnicity. It is also important to include both as separate measures because they each represent an important dimension of Huntington's (1993a; 1996) civilizations, brobdingnagian political units defined

primarily by religion, ethnicity, and language (also see CFS 2009; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006). Language, by contrast, can be justifiably dropped from the analysis due to its strong link with ethnicity, and because of the sparsity of language data in the *World Factbook* (CIA 2000-2009).

Finally, although I only examine countries with populations of 1,000,000 or more, I include the natural log of each country's population and land area using data from the *World Factbook* (CIA 2000-2009). A series of dummies control for region, and finally, I control for duration dependence in the models to compensate for possible violations of temporal assumptions, particularly in the logit model (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). At present, I have no theoretical reason to expect time to have a substantively intriguing effect on these models, so a series of temporal dummy variables are included as simple controls only.

5 | Results

As laid out in the preceding chapter, I examine outbursts of domestic terrorism that took place throughout the first decade of the 21st century in Asia and Africa, subjecting the RFPT to a battery of statistical tests in the process. This produced an *n* of 928, but since information for all variables is not presently available, several cases are automatically dropped from the analysis.[24] Nevertheless, the study includes information for most Asian and African states during the period under consideration, and as such, the analysis should help shed light on the impact of religious freedom on domestic terrorism throughout the non-Western world. The results of the analysis are presented and discussed here in three phases. The first phase of the analysis relies on logistic regression to examine the impact of religious diversity and religious freedom on the *occurrence* of terrorism. In the second phase, I consider the impact of religious diversity and religious freedom on the *rate* of domestic terrorism, substituting the logit model of the first section for a negative binomial approach. In the final section, I turn to the impact of religious diversity and religious freedom on the level of violence produced by these attacks.

A Logistic Assessment of the RFPT

Table 2 details the results of the logit analysis. Models 1-4 are based on terrorism data taken from the RDWTI (2016), while Models 5-8 utilize data from the GTD (START 2016). Under the first four columns, Models 1 and 2 provide a baseline by which to compare the effects of religious freedom and religious diversity on the occurrence of domestic terrorism in Model 3. Although neither of these models includes all of the relevant variables, they provide

Table 2. Logit Analysis of Domestic Terrorism in Asian and African States, 2000-2009

Predictors	RDWTI				GDT			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Religious Diversity	0.939	-	0.934	0.948	1.006	-	1.005	0.941
	(-0.81)		(-0.86)	(-0.46)	(0.08)		(0.07)	(-0.49)
Religious Freedom	-	0.607	0.601	0.69	-	0.703	0.704	0.435
		(-1.10)	(-1.12)	(-0.42)		(-0.95)	(-0.95)	(-1.21)
Religious Freedom × Religious Diversity	-	-	-	0.968	-	-	-	1.122
				(-0.22)				(0.94)
Ethnicity	1.041	1.033	1.038	1.037	1.105	1.102	1.101	1.107
	(1.22)	(1.00)	(1.12)	(1.12)	(1.55)	(1.57)	(1.56)	(1.54)
Democracy	1.081 *	1.096 *	1.102 *	1.103 *	1.091 **	1.106 **	1.105 **	1.105 **
	(2.32)	(2.32)	(2.36)	(2.39)	(2.72)	(3.10)	(2.95)	.299
Democracy^2	0.995	0.997	0.996	0.996	0.994	0.994	0.995	0.994
	(-0.81)	(-0.59)	(-0.67)	(-0.61)	(-1.04)	(-0.98)	(-0.97)	(-1.10)
GDPpcPPP (log)	0.935	0.933	0.937	0.937	0.775	0.777	0.777	-0.775
	(-0.45)	(-0.48)	(-0.44)	(-0.45)	(-1.58)	(-1.57)	(-1.57)	(-1.59)
Population (log)	1.889 **	1.779 **	1.800 **	1.800 **	1.955 ***	1.903 ***	1.901 ***	1.898 ***
	(2.77)	(2.71)	(2.78)	(2.79)	(4.30)	(4.12)	(4.08)	(4.02)
Land Area (log)	1.026	1.082	1.052	1.057	0.976	0.984	0.987	0.973
	(0.18)	(0.60)	(0.39)	(0.41)	(-0.18)	(-0.12)	(-0.10)	(-0.21)
Russia and Central Assia	0.934	1.060	0.950	0.965	0.358	0.358	0.361	0.337
	(-0.13)	(0.11)	(-0.09)	(-0.06)	(-1.59)	(-1.64)	(-1.55)	(-1.62)
East Asia	0.031 ***	0.042 ***	0.037 ***	0.038 ***	0.044 **	0.049 **	0.049 **	0.050 **
	(-3.74)	(-3.43)	(-3.54)	(-3.52)	(-3.13)	(-3.04)	(-3.01)	(-2.94)
South Asia	0.982	1.276	1.104	1.116	3.180	3.328	3.376	3.112
	(-0.03)	(0.38)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(1.38)	(1.45)	(1.42)	(1.31)
South East Asia	0.401	0.441	0.449	0.451	0.281 *	0.303	0.303	0.301
	(-1.53)	(-1.35)	(-1.32)	(-1.31)	(-2.01)	(-1.84)	(-1.83)	(-1.87)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.099 ***	0.130 ***	0.117 ***	0.118 ***	0.218 **	0.247 *	0.249 *	0.241 *
	(-3.92)	(-3.58)	(-3.68)	(-3.63)	(-2.67)	(-2.47)	(-2.36)	(-2.38)
2001	1.976 *	1.891 *	1.911 *	1.910 *	1.109	1.083	1.1082	1.085
	(2.48)	(2.34)	(2.35)	(2.35)	(0.30)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
2002	2.250 *	2.169 *	2.197 *	2.195 *	1.028	1.002	1.001	1.006
	(2.52)	(2.37)	(2.41)	(2.41)	(0.09)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.02)
2003	1.660	1.662	1.689	1.686	0.711	0.716	0.715	0.723
	(1.56)	(1.55)	(1.59)	(1.58)	(-1.03)	(-1.01)	(-1.01)	(-0.98)
2004	1.763	1.784	1.818	1.810	0.386 **	0.388 **	0.387 **	0.396 **
	(1.59)	(1.58)	(1.62)	(1.59)	(-2.85)	(-2.82)	(-2.81)	(-2.73)
2005	1.434	1.462	1.490	1.484	0.608	0.621	0.621	0.634
	(1.03)	(1.07)	(1.11)	(1.09)	(-1.49)	(-1.40)	(-1.40)	(-1.34)
2006	1.005	1.014	1.051	1.049	0.703	0.722	0.721	0.730
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(-1.01)	(-0.93)	(-0.93)	(-0.89)
2007	1.232	1.271	1.310	1.320	0.750	1.324	0.772	0.757
	(0.60)	(0.67)	(0.75)	(0.79)	(-0.83)	(-0.73)	(-0.73)	(-0.78)
2008	0.976	0.970	1.014	1.016	1.290	1.324	1.320	1.324
	(-0.08)	(-0.09)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.70)	(0.75)	(0.75)	(0.76)
2009	0.150 ***	0.148 ***	0.15 ***	0.151 ***	0.843	0.8667	0.864	0.838
	(-3.17)	(-3.41)	(-3.34)	(-3.07)	(0.46)	(-0.38)	(-0.38)	(-0.46)

Note: N = 897. Models report odds ratios with *z*-scores in parentheses. Results are clustered by country to allow for Huber-White robust standard errors (not shown). Missing cases were dropped by Stata because values for Polity IV democracy scores for Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine do not exist under periods of occupation. Another version of the fully-specified models (4 and 8) recording missing values as 0 is not shown becuase there was no noticeable change in the results. It is available upon request.

* p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.

some initial evidence against the first two hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 seeks to find evidence of the clash of civilizations or diversity dividend. Neither seems present in the RDWTI data.



Figure 4. Plot of first differences. First differences represent discrete changes in predicted probabilities. Here, the FDs measure a change from 1 SD below the mean to 1 SD above it, yielding the chance of experiencing a domestic terror attack. These variables are discrete – FD is a change from 0 to 1.

Looking exclusively at Model 1, we see a negative effect that suggests diversity correlates with reductions in domestic terrorism, but this evidence cannot substantiate CFS's earlier findings, as there is no real discernable effect. Model 2 tries to evaluate the expectations of the RFPT, and again finds no strong support for the idea that religious freedom reduces domestic terrorism. When both variables are included in Model 3, each points in the expected direction, but neither gains significance.

At least part of the problem can be visualized in Figure 4, a plot of first differences using Model 4. A state's chance of experiencing a domestic terrorist attack, *ceteris paribus*, declines by 6% as *Religious Freedom* increases from 0 to 1. As illustrated above though, the enormous confidence interval undermines the effect, rendering it indistinguishable from zero. Of course,

the confidence intervals for *Religious Diversity* and *Ethnic Diversity* both cross 0, meaning there is no sign of the diversity dividend or clashing civilizations in these preliminary results. While this is troubling for Hypotheses 1 and 2 (particularly with regards to the occurrence of terrorism), these data do not offer any information about the level of terrorist violence across Asia and Africa, so this subject will be addressed shortly. In the meantime, proponents of the RFPT will be similarly disappointed by the findings reported in Model 4. Here, where I attempt to assess the thesis' neo-Lockean variant, we find no statistically significant results for any of the relevant variables.

Upon reviewing Figure 5, which looks at the predicted probability of experiencing a terrorist attack (again based on Model 4), it's not difficult to explain why. The directionality of the red trend-line, representing the effect of religious freedom, generally conforms to expectations, but there are a couple problems that come to light in the graph. First, the blue line, representing religious non-freedom, also trends consistently in a downward direction. While there is some indication that religiously free states have a lower probability of experiencing a terrorist attack as the RFPT suggests, the neo-Lockean model depicted in Figure 2 expects religious non-freedom to encourage violence as the number of religious groups increases. Of course, this means Figure 5 does seem to offer some tentative support to the diversity dividend, as it appears to manifest regardless of the state's church-state relationship. Indeed, the probability of a religiously non-free state experiencing a terrorist attack drops noticeably with the inclusion of each new religious group.

Nevertheless, this is where the second problem emerges to challenge the interpretation of these findings: the 95% confidence intervals surrounding the two trend-lines overlap, meaning we cannot distinguish the effects of religious freedom from the effects of religious non-freedom



Figure 5. Predicted probabilities of experiencing a domestic terror attack by church-state relationship across the number of sizeable religious groups.

given the current scope of the data. Since the overlap of these confidence intervals makes it impossible to discern the difference between religious freedom and non-freedom, Hypothesis 3 cannot be confirmed. Worse still, is that the confidence intervals start to overlap with zero once a society has around 11 major religious groups, meaning that religious freedom and religious non-freedom cease to have a distinguishable effect in highly diverse societies. Together, these issues undermine what little support Figure 5 does offer for Hypothesis 3. Notice that the ability of religious freedom to contribute to reductions in domestic terrorism as societies start to become religiously diverse (i.e., as the estimated total number of religions increases from 1 to 9) is clearly distinguishable from zero, if not from the effect of religious non-freedom.

Some interesting findings do materialize when looking at the bottom of Table 2 though. CFS (2009) found no evidence supporting the idea that democracy impacts domestic terrorism in Asia and Africa, but democratic states are significantly more likely to experience an attack than non-democratic states in both datasets. This may be because terrorism can exploit an open society (Huntington 1996) or because terrorism is the only viable form of violent contestation in a democratic state (Ash 2016), but since democracy and religious freedom are supposed to go hand-in-hand (r = .5027) this may provide additional, if circumstantial, evidence against the RFPT. Even so, the substantive effect of democracy is small. Returning to Figure 4, we see that the probability of a democratic state experiencing a domestic terror attack only increases by about 1%, all other things equal.

Next, states with a large population experience greater levels of violence, probably because there is a greater possibility to achieve a successful mass casualty attack, but this finding is not at all surprising. Finally, there is some regional variation detected in the model, which shows that states in East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are least prone to experiencing domestic terrorism. During an earlier phase of this project, I found some evidence for the RFPT by looking at domestic terrorism in Africa (Herrington 2015). Perhaps this earlier finding was an artifact of the data, resulting from a lack of regional variation. Since the states of Sub-Saharan Africa generally experience less terrorism than any of the others in the data, religious freedom might have seemed more important than it apparently really is.

The data from the right-hand side of Table 2 generally conforms to these findings, but this is not that surprising. While the RDWTI is more conservative than the GTD, the two dichotomous variables are still highly correlated (r = 0.5485). The only noteworthy difference in the analysis of the GTD data seems to stem from the inclusion of the temporal dummy variables.

There is almost no distinct annual effect in the GTD data, while more appears on the left side of the table. Since temporal dummies are difficult to interpret, I conducted a likelihood-ratio (LR) test of the fully specified models (4 and 8) that compared them to a pair of nested models that dropped the temporal variables altogether (not shown). Of course, the LR test is not necessarily a reliable tool when assessing temporal dependence in either dataset, but the results provide at least some indication as to how seriously we should take the possible problem of temporal dependence in the models. While bearing in mind the fact that a more sophisticated approach should do better, according to the LR test of the GTD data, we get a test statistic (χ^2) of 14.19 on nine degrees of freedom and a relatively large p-value (prob > χ^2) equaling .1157. This suggests that the temporal dummies add little explanatory power to a constrained model that excludes them. According to the test of the RDWTI data, by contrast, the temporal dummies create a statistically significant improvement to the fit of the model. With a small p-value close to zero, even when rounded to the fourth decimal place, the LR test indicates that temporal dependence may be a real problem on the left side of Table 2. Unfortunately, I have no theoretical explanation to explain the impact of time on domestic terrorism in Asia and Africa at present.

Analyzing the Attack Rate

Although the prior section concentrates on whether or not religiously free states have a lower probability of experiencing a domestic terrorist attack than their more restrictive counterparts, the results in Table 2 tell us little about the moderating potential of religious freedom. Since the RFPT expects groups operating in an open religious economy to temper their positions while competing for adherents (Iannaccone and Berman 2006; Smith 1776), it is necessary to consider whether or not religiously free states in Asia and Africa experience fewer terror attacks than states where religious restrictions would constrict the ideational economy. In

this phase of the analysis, I turn to this question with a series of negative binomial models that help explain the rate of domestic terrorism in Asia and Africa using the same variables as found in Table 2.

Since the first phase of this study provided little evidence in favor of the RFPT, it is somewhat unsurprising that religious freedom, as illustrated in Table 3, consistently fails to contribute significantly to reductions in terrorist attacks. Intriguingly, the direction of the effect in all six relevant models does point in the theorized direction, but only in Model 11 does religious freedom obtain statistical significance. This is the first time religious freedom has had a noteworthy impact on terrorism reductions, but the robustness of this finding is in doubt since Model 15 fails to substantiate the result with data drawn from the GTD (START 2016). It would, therefore, constitute an act of intellectual dishonesty to hold the finding in Model 11 up as evidence in favor of the RFPT. Although I also measure violence with the annual casualty rate in the third phase of this analysis, it is starting to look as if there is not enough evidence to support Hypothesis 2, the central claim of the RFPT on investigation in this study.

Intriguingly though, evidence for the "diversity dividend" does emerge in Table 3. As seen in Models 9, 11, and 12, higher levels of religious diversity are correlated with reductions in domestic terrorism, a finding robust even to the inclusion of *Religious Freedom* in Models 11 and 12. However, unlike CFS (2009), there is no evidence of the diversity dividend emerging from increases in politically salient ethnic groups, and incidentally, findings on the right side of the table clearly clash with CFS's claims. Increases in the number of politically relevant ethnic groups actually lead to increases in domestic terrorism, according to the data drawn from the GTD. Taken together with the results on religious diversity from the right-side of Table 3, evidence for the diversity dividend—dealing with ethnic groups or religious groups —seems

Table 3. Negative Binomial Analysis of Domestic Terror in Asian and African States, 2000-2009

Predictors	RDWTI				GDT			
	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16
Religious Diversity	-0.280**	-	-0.306***	-0.321***	-0.130	-	-0.130	-0.181*
	(0.09)		(0.08)	(0.1)	(0.08)		(0.08)	(0.09)
Religious Freedom	-	-1.027	-1.128*	-1.656	-	-0.071	-0.036	-1.381
		(0.55)	(0.52)	(0.97)		(0.4)	(0.37)	(1.04)
Religious Freedom × Religious Diversity	-	-	-	0.129	-	-	-	0.313
				(0.19)				(0.23)
Ethnicity	0.001	-0.028	-0.01	-0.009	0.049*	0.032	0.049*	0.054**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Democracy	0.139***	0.155***	0.172***	0.168***	0.102***	0.100***	0.103***	0.100***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
$Democracy^2$	-0.008	-0.005	-0.008	-0.010	-0.014*	-0.013*	-0.014*	-0.018**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDPpcPPP (log)	-0.2	0.076	0.073	0.088	0.048	0.063	0.052	0.133
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Population (log)	1.087***	0.970***	1.128***	1.102***	0.829***	0.789***	0.827***	0.759***
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.2)
Land Area (log)	-0.218	-0.026	-0.27	-0.271	-0.168	-0.056	-0.168	-0.154
	(0.2)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.2)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Russia and Central Assia	-1.576*	-0.867	-1.296*	-1.328*	-2.254***	-2.007**	-2.246***	-2.360***
	(0.67)	(0.68)	(0.64)	(0.63)	(0.68)	(0.64)	(0.67)	(0.64)
East Asia	-5.471***	-4.831***	-5.292***	-5.210***	-5.337***	-5.022***	-5.324***	-5.187***
	(0.77)	(0.79)	(0.77)	(0.79)	(0.72)	(0.76)	(0.75)	(0.79)
South Asia	-0.627	0.235	-0.279	-0.291	-0.015	0.218	-0.004	0.134
	(0.82)	(0.74)	(0.72)	(0.71)	(0.67)	(0.66)	(0.66)	(0.65)
South East Asia	-1.368	-0.638	-0.767	-0.792	-0.810	-0.769	-0.790	-0.775
	(0.8)	(0.83)	(0.76)	(0.77)	(0.69)	(0.72)	(0.69)	(0.69)
Sub-Saharan Africa	-3.633***	-2.545***	-3.053***	-3.062***	-1.709*	-1.421*	-1.692*	-1.640*
	(0.79)	(0.77)	(0.75)	(0.74)	(0.69)	(.68)	(0.69)	(0.66)
2001	0.696*	0.765*	0.749*	0.753*	-0.036	-0.033	-0.035	-0.048
	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.26)
2002	0.912***	0.706*	0.822**	0.805**	-0.525	-0.531	-0.531	-0.603*
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.3)	(0.3)
2003	0.747*	0.658*	0.658*	0.645*	-0.679*	-0.655*	-0.686*	-0.766**
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.29)
2004	1.081**	0.835*	0.910*	0.912*	-1.222***	-1.222***	-1.232***	-1.285***
	(0.36)	(0.34)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.33)
2005	1.165***	0.804**	1.021**	1.036**	-0.729*	-0.774*	-0.737*	-0.766*
	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.34)
2006	1.519***	1.459**	1.557***	1.564***	-0.356	-0.350	-0.357	-0.462
	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.46)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)
2007	1.714***	1.783***	1.544**	1.478**	-0.271	-0.298	-0.277	-0.519
	(0.52)	(0.54)	(0.48)	(0.47)	(0.45)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.41)
2008	2.107***	2.164***	1.905***	1.815***	0.638	0.502	0.626	0.492
	(0.53)	(0.55)	(0.47)	(0.46)	(0.47)	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.43)
2009	-0.345	-0.298	-0.519	-0.600	0.233	0.173	0.225	-0.048
	(0.71)	(0.72)	(0.61)	(0.59)	(0.43)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.41)

Note: N (RDWTI) = 887; *N* (GDT) = 897. Models report slope coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Missing cases were dropped by Stata. Another version of the fully-specified models (4 and 8) recoding missing values as 0 is not shown becuase there was no noticeable change in the results. It is available upon request.

* p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.

inconclusive. Add to this the weak empirical support for the RFPT's Smithian contention (Iannaccone and Berman 2006; Smith 1776) that participation in a diverse ideational marketplace



Figure 6. Plot of first differences. First differences represent discrete changes in predicted probabilities. Here, the FDs measure a change from 1 SD below the mean to 1 SD above it, yielding the chance of experiencing a domestic terror attack. These variables are discrete – FD is a change from 0 to 1.

should encourage extremists to moderate, and Hypotheses 1 and 2 both seem to lose out. Of course, the neo-Lockean variant finds no support in Table 3 either.

When we turn our attention to the control variables though, democracy again seems to win out. Here, we see that democratic societies are not just more prone to experiencing a terrorist attack; they are more likely to experience a *greater number* of domestic attacks! This finding is consistent across all eight models in Table 3, and as illustrated in Figure 6, democracy has a much larger substantive impact than it did in Figure 4. In fact, based on Model 16, and holding all else constant, states with higher Polity scores have a 20% greater chance of experiencing a domestic terrorist attack than do states with comparatively low Polity scores. The democracy square term, included as a measure of anocracy, takes on statistical significance in the

data from the right side of Table 3. Though this finding is not robust to the RDWTI data, it indicates that anocratic regimes, which are usually more prone to instability (Vreeland 2008), are likely to experience fewer domestic terrorist attacks than democratic states, but more than autocratic states (also see Figure 7 below).

Population again materializes as a significant predictor of domestic terrorism in both models. More highly populated states are at risk of experiencing a greater number of attacks, presumably because they offer a larger pool of potential targets. A similar assumption lies behind risk assessments for urban areas. According to a report by the RAND Corporation (Willis, et. al 2005), this makes it necessary to consider the possibility that population density or density weighted population might make for better predictors. It is unclear if these factors, which are applicable at the urban level, may be relevant at the national level though. I ran a separate model looking at both, but neither variable was found significant. They are reported in the Appendix, excluded from this analysis to avoid the appearance of malicious data mining. It is worth noting that the inclusion of these variables allows all three independent variables (*Religious Diversity*, *Religious Freedom*, and the interaction term to gain significance, but as illustrated in the Appendix, the substantive effect of these variables is trivial. As with the evidence found earlier in Model 11, holding these findings up in support of the RFPT would be misleading at best, and intellectually dishonest at worst, especially since the inclusion of either of these variables into the relevant models rests on shaky theoretical underpinnings.

Finally, turning to the regional variables, the findings generally conform to those found in Table 2. Sub-Saharan African states are not just at a lower risk of experiencing terrorist attacks in general, those that do experience such violence are likely to experience fewer attacks than states in any other region. The same goes for East Asia. They not just have a lower probability

of being attacked by their own citizens, those that are attacked experience fewer than those that are attacked in other regions. One additional finding stands out: Russia and the Central Asian states also experience fewer attacks than their non-regional neighbors. Table 2 gave no indication that these states were less likely to experience an attack than their non-regional neighbors, but the fact that this finding appears in 7 out of 8 of the models in Table 3 suggests that it is robust.

The RFPT and Domestic Terror Casualties

Table 4 looks at terrorist violence in another light, as the DV shifts from terrorist attacks to the annual casualty rate. The first important finding of note is that religious freedom still lacks significance in these final models. Taken together with the previous 16 models, this suggests that religious freedom may not be quite the panacea for the world's problems as the RFPT suggests—at least where domestic terrorism is concerned, anyway. This is particularly noteworthy, as even Locke, Smith, and Madison expect governmental deregulation of the religious landscape to encourage moderation. Next, Models 17-20 continue to offer support for the diversity dividend. States with a greater level of religious diversity experience fewer terror-related casualties when they are attacked than states with fewer religious groups, and religious regulation matters not. As seen in Model 20, the neo-Lockean variant of the RFPT articulated in Hypothesis 3 finds no support. Unfortunately, these findings are not replicated in the GTD data on the right-hand side of Table 4. Still, the effects presented in Models 21-24 point in a direction consistent with the diversity dividend, offering a relatively exhaustive refutation of the clash of civilizations. These findings may also clash with Mia Bloom's (2005) theory of outbidding, which suggests that terrorists in a crowded market will become increasingly violent as they vie for public attention. In reality, however, we must be cautious about such a conclusion as

Table 4. Negative Bimonial Analysis of Domestic Terror Casualties in Asian and African States, 2000-2009

Predictors	RDWTI				GDT			
	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21	Model 22	Model 23	Model 24
Religious Diversity	-0.253**	-	-0.279**	-0.283**	-0.144	-	-0.144	-0.164
	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.09)
Religious Freedom	-	-0.795	-0.956	-1.529	-	-0.140	-0.116	-1.045
		(0.64)	(0.58)	(1.80)		(0.45)	(0.43)	(1.49)
Religious Freedom × Religious Diversity	-	-	-	0.138	-	-	-	0.225
				(0.41)				(0.34)
Ethnicity	0.026	-0.009	0.017	0.019	0.101***	0.079**	0.101***	0.106***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Democracy	0.114**	0.142**	0.145***	0.139**	0.107**	0.114**	0.111**	0.102*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Democracy^2	-0.013	-0.010	-0.013	-0.015	-0.016*	-0.013	-0.016*	-0.018*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDPpcPPP (log)	-0.625	-0.419	-0.409	-0.379	-0.426	-0.416	-0.409	-0.355
	(0.36)	(0.42)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.34)
Population (log)	1.609***	1.475***	1.604***	1.565***	1.197***	1.170***	1.186***	1.124***
	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.39)	(0.43)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.24)
Land Area (log)	-0.413	-0.141	-0.445	-0.432	-0.288	-0.149	-0.285	-0.263
	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.20)
Russia and Central Assia	-2.947***	-2.270*	-2.625**	-2.647**	-3.679***	-3.369***	-3.652***	-3.700***
	(0.81)	(0.90)	(0.83)	(0.82)	(0.75)	(0.72)	(0.74)	(0.74)
East Asia	-9.839***	-8.911***	-9.503***	-9.411***	-6.930***	-6.653***	-6.922***	-6.892***
	(1.04)	(1.09)	(1.01)	(1.10)	(1.04)	(1.03)	(1.05)	(1.06)
South Asia	-2.225	-1.338	-1.863	-1.791	-1.554	-1.229	-1.517	-1.348
	(1.15)	(1.18)	(1.09)	(1.13)	(0.89)	(0.89)	(0.88)	(0.94)
South East Asia	-2.734*	-2.052	-2.109*	-2.103	-2.266**	-2.193**	-2.206**	-2.179**
	(1.09)	(1.18)	(1.07)	(1.08)	(0.81)	(0.85)	(0.83)	(0.84)
Sub-Saharan Africa	-4.400***	-3.532**	-3.990***	-3.976***	-2.810**	-2.431**	-2.760**	-2.691**
	(1.06)	(1.16)	(1.05)	(1.05)	(0.90)	(0.92)	(0.91)	(0.94)
2001	2.273*	2.528**	2.894**	2.966**	0.680	0.606	0.721	0.758
	(0.92)	(0.93)	(1.06)	(1.09)	(0.59)	(0.55)	(0.56)	(0.55)
2002	1.267**	1.341**	1.162*	1.164*	-0.230	-0.218	-0.224	-0.239
	(0.44)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.46)	(0.44)	(0.46)	(0.47)
2003	1.010*	1.184*	0.989*	0.999*	-0.826*	-0.787*	-0.832*	-0.879*
	(0.45)	(0.48)	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.40)	(0.38)	(0.40)	(0.40)
2004	2.301***	2.113***	2.181***	2.176***	-0.939	-1.035*	-0.960	-0.936
	(0.62)	(0.59)	(0.65)	(0.65)	(0.50)	(0.48)	(0.50)	(0.52)
2005	1.246**	0.879*	1.085*	1.087*	-0.784	-0.921*	-0.797	-0.787
	(0.42)	(0.38)	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.42)	(0.45)	(0.46)
2006	0.740	0.725	0.799	0.783	-0.530	-0.565	-0.519	-0.608
	(0.50)	(0.51)	(0.48)	(0.49)	(0.46)	(0.44)	(0.46)	(0.48)
2007	1.199*	1.221*	1.055*	0.997	-0.386	-0.487	-0.384	-0.558
	(0.54)	(0.58)	(0.50)	(0.54)	(0.51)	(0.49)	(0.52)	(0.55)
2008	2.164***	1.943***	1.962***	1.895***	0.345	0.091	0.304	0.286
	(0.55)	(0.58)	(0.53)	(0.57)	(0.56)	(0.50)	(0.53)	(0.56)
2009	-0.218	-0.270	-0.490	-0.540	-0.169	-0.207	-0.196	-0.333
	(0.56)	(0.60)	(0.51)	(0.53)	(0.52)	(0.53)	(0.50)	(0.53)

Note: N (RDWTI) = 887; *N* (GDT) = 897. Models report slope coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Missing cases were dropped by Stata. Another version of the fully-specified models (4 and 8) recoding missing values as 0 is not shown becuase there was no noticeable change in the main variables of interest. It is available upon request.

* p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.

Bloom's theory deals with the number of perpetrators in a society, rather than the diversity of their audience. It's unclear if the number of religious groups in a society can really serve as a proxy for perpetrators, though the market-based approach might suggest they can.

Nevertheless, the effect of *Ethnicity* that manifests on the right-hand side of the Table could offer support for Bloom's ideas, and evidence against the diversity dividend. Of course, it's again important to acknowledge that ethnicity and religion are empirically distinct categories, but it is striking that the effects of these two variables point in different directions because both hinted at the diversity dividend in CFS's (2009) original study. As with Table 3 though, these findings are not replicated on both sides of Table 4. Next, living in Russia, Central Asia, East Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa continues to come with the benefit of reduced violence, as the states in these regions experience attacks that result in fewer terror-related casualties. Though it is not shown, a model replacing missing Polity IV scores with 0 showed South and South East Asian states to yield fewer casualties as well, but this model did not change in any other regard.

Finally, population and democracy are shown, once more, to be significant predictors of terrorist violence. Highly populated and open states are thus more likely to experience deadlier domestic terror attacks than their low-population or non-democratic counterparts. Perhaps the most interesting facet of this finding is depicted in Figure 7. Although democracy is consistently associated with increased domestic terrorism, it's important not to take this as if democracies exist in a vacuum. Anocracies are typically associated with instability (Vreeland 2008), and instability appears as *the chief predictor* of terrorism in CFS's (2009) analysis. Astonishingly though, the curvilinear relationship depicted for attack casualties matches that depicted for the total number of attacks in both datasets. As such, Figure 7 shows that the rate of domestic terrorism in Asia and Africa consistently climbs across regime types, leaving democracies the



Figure 7. Predicted probabilities of experiencing a domestic terror across regime type.

most susceptible. Of course, the confidence intervals do grow quite wide as regimes become more liberal, with the confidence intervals in the top right quadrant even crossing zero. However, this can be attributed to the fact that democracies represent a minority in Asia and Africa. Indeed, autocracies and anocracies account for 619/928 country years in the data. Finally, that autocracies stand out as the least violent is quite unsurprising, given that repressive regimes have long been credited for their ability to act swiftly and punitively in response to such threats (Hamilton and Hamilton 1983).

Concluding Thoughts

As reported in Table 5, there is virtually no good news for proponents of the RFPT. Neither Hypotheses 2 nor 3 receives any meaningful support in the preceding analyses. This study also joins a chorus of prior works that find no support for the clash of civilizations thesis.

Table 5. Summary of Hypotheses and Findings

	Description	Theoretical Basis	Finding
Hypothesis 1_A	Increased levels of diversity will result in *reductions* in the occurrence and level of terrorist violence.	According to CFS (2009), "the diversity dividend" creates a *de facto* system of cultural checks and balances.	Limited Support. The diversity dividend correlates with reductions in violence in the RDWTI, but not the GDT.
Hypothesis 1_B	Increased levels of diversity will result in *increases* in the occurrence and level of terrorist violence.	According to Huntington (1993a; 1996), clashing civilizations will render multicultural societies prone to violence.	No Support. When religious diversity is significant, it has a negative effect on terrorism.
Hypothesis 2	The presence of religious freedom will result in *reductions* in the occurrence and level of terrorist violence.	According to the RFPT (e.g., Farr 2008), religiously free states will see major reductions in violence of all kinds.	No Support. The effect of religious freedom points in the anticipated direction, but lacks significance.
Hypothesis 3_A	Diversity under conditions of religious freedom will result in *reductions* in the occurrence and level of terrorist violence.	According to Locke (1667; 1689), religious toleration is key to ameliorating violence in diverse societies.	No support. The effect of religious freedom across religions lacks significance.
Hypothesis 3_B	Diversity under conditions of religious non-freedom will result in *increases* in the occurrence and level of terrorist violence.	According to Locke (1667; 1689), religious intolerance is is the cause of violence in diverse societies.	No support. The effect of religious non-freedom across religions does not increase violence.

Indeed, Hypothesis 1_A is the only prediction articulated in Chapter 4 to receive even limited support. The battery of statistical models presented throughout the three phases of this analysis provide for a relatively exhaustive examination of the effects of religious freedom and religious diversity on domestic terrorism in Asia and Africa over the first decade of the 21st century. Using two different terrorism datasets (RDWTI 2016; START 2016), as well as religious freedom data from the U.S. State Department (2000-2009) and demographic data from the CIA (2000-2009), I find no empirical evidence supporting the RFPT, and although Models 9-12, 16, and 17-20 indicate that religious diversity is associated with a decline in domestic terrorist violence, this evidence may be an artifact of the data from the RDWTI. Without evidence from the GTD, which reports a greater number of attacks per country per year, supporting this finding, it's difficult to determine if religious diversity really has a meaningful impact on domestic terrorism.

Although this study focuses exclusively on domestic terrorism, these findings present a real dilemma for the RFPT. So, where do we go from here? As noted in Chapter 4, religious freedom, particularly the way it has been theorized and measured in this analysis, is a Western concept. If the RFPT does not have empirical muster in the non-Western world, perhaps it's

time for scholars to critically reevaluate the religious freedom research agenda, particularly with regard to its neocolonial implications. It is towards this end—the problematization of the RFPT—that I now turn.

6 | Problematizing the Religious Freedom Peace Thesis

Emphasizing the special role of religious freedom in human social life as the "first freedom," the RFPT proposes a grievance-based model of terrorism and political violence that places the onus for such violence on religious regulation and persecution. Proponents of the RFPT might thus be unsurprised to learn how the religious persecution of the Branch Davidians, as noted in Chapter 1, served as fodder for McVeigh, who cited the ATF's siege at Waco to justify his twisted deeds in 1995. They might likewise find the fact that ISIS militants see religious persecution as the key to enlisting "gray zone" Muslims in their war with the West more than a little disturbing. Yet, the idea that grievances matter is hardly new to the terrorism literature: Martha Crenshaw (1981: 383) described "the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, such as an ethnic minority discriminated against by the majority" as the "first condition that can be considered a direct cause of terrorism" three and a half decades ago.

More recently, research on domestic terrorism has tried to highlight the role of a number of similar factors in the production of political violence. Ghatak's (2014) study finds discrimination and increased trade in the face of discrimination to be important predictors of domestic terrorism in South Asia. Meanwhile, he and Aaron Gold (Ghatak and Gold 2015) find that high- and middle-income countries are especially prone to terrorism when minority discrimination presents itself as a major social problem, and Seung Whan Choi and Piazza (2016) suggest that the political exclusion of minority ethnic groups represents a better determinant of domestic terrorism than either general repression or economic discrimination.

Thus, it would seem that there isn't anything particularly novel about the idea that grievances play a role in producing terrorism, but what is unique about the RFPT is its attribution of the state's relationship with religious groups as the problem driving political violence. An issue arises though, when we realize that the 2015 attacks on Paris were themselves not actually motivated by perceptions of religious persecution. In fact, ISIS's official statement instead attributes its attack to the fact that Paris is at the heart of Western "abominations and perversion" (Jones 2015), while the issue with Islamophobia in the U.S. and Europe more accurately concerns the West's response to these attacks. Even McVeigh, a right-wing, anti-government extremist had ulterior motives, suggesting that his was a response to government overreach, in general (Durham 1996). As such, Piazza's (2015b) work on rightwing terrorism in the U.S. limns several potentially important insights into what may have been driving McVeigh and his coconspirators. That is, Piazza shows right wing groups to be motivated by increases in abortion, female labor force participation, and Democratic control of the White House. Of course, the study demonstrates some challenges to the comparative study of domestic terrorism by highlighting such context-specific factors, but it nevertheless presents a foil to the explanation of these attacks offered from the perspective of the RFPT.

Indeed, even the case of Malawi, which epitomizes Applebee's notion of religious ambivalence so well, stands out as problematic to the narrative of the RFPT. While proponents of the RFPT might point to the democratic and interfaith activism of Malawi's religious communities as a sign of the prosocial side of ambivalence, it's important to consider the fact that the arrests of Malawian Catholic bishops represents a clear episode of religious liberty violations. In the face of a government crackdown on their religious leaders, the RFPT might have expected members of the Malawian Catholic laity to respond by producing their own

Joseph Kony or developing their own LRA. That the religious communities of Malawi came together and founded a pro-democratic political action group rather than allowing their nation to disintegrate into sectarian strife as has happened in Uganda could not have been anticipated.

This brings us to the problematic implications of this study. The preceding analyses yielded a series of results that confound the expectations of the RFPT. Although I find evidence, like CFS (2009), that religious heterogeneity seems to play a role in muting the general level of violence experienced by Asian and African states, this finding is problematic for two reasons. To begin with, violence—which was measured by the number of annual domestic terrorist attacks and the number of casualties resulting from those attacks—tells us little about the propensity for a state to experience terrorism in the first place. As reported in Models 1-8 of Table 2, religious diversity does not have a statistically significant impact on the occurrence of domestic terrorist attacks. Second, although it appears that the number of attacks and casualties are reduced in religiously diverse societies, this finding is limited to data produced by the RAND Corporation (2016). It could not be corroborated with data from the GTD (Berkebile 2015; START 2016), suggesting that there may not really be a diversity dividend at work. Findings from the GTD also contradict CFS's (2009) notion of a diversity dividend where ethnicity is concerned, as increases in ethnic diversity are associated with increased levels of domestic terrorist violence.

Also concerning for the RFPT is the fact that presence of religious freedom in a society does not seem to lead to reductions in domestic terrorism. Of course, this does not mean that the RFPT has been invalidated since this study focuses exclusively on the impact of religious liberty on domestic terrorism, but it certainly does cast skepticism on the claims that religious freedom functions as a panacea for the world's problems. Indeed, since these anticlimactic findings were

drawn from the non-Western world—Asia and Africa—it stands to reason that proponents of the RFPT should temper some of their claims and take criticisms of their approach more seriously. While Farr and others increasingly treat religious freedom as a panacea for the world's social and political ills—a force multiplier capable of, *inter alia*, fostering democracy and reducing political violence—these findings obviously problematize this approach in several ways, especially where its normative implications are concerned.

For example, the findings reported in Chapter 5 add weight to Hurd's (2013; 2015) criticisms of the religious freedom research agenda. She highlights the normative consequences of international religious freedom advocacy, among which is a tendency to over privilege and thus reify the religious dimension of intergroup conflicts, as is the case with the Rohingya people of Myanmar. Hurd trenchantly demonstrates that the focus on the Rohingya's Muslim identity has led many to depict their plight as one of religious oppression, but this consequently misses the fact that the discrimination leveled at the Rohingya "is complex and multifaceted," with "ethnic, racial, economic, political, postcolonial, and national" dimensions, ultimately making the group's problems even more difficult to solve (Hurd 2015, 46-47). As this chapter therefore makes clear, scholars and advocates of religious freedom abroad must be cognizant of the potential unintended consequences that may flow from their policy preferences.

Liberal Imperialism and Military Humanitarianism

For a body of research that has already been described by one diplomatic historian as a "faith-inflected version of democratic peace theory" (Preston 2013, 11), this should be a particularly salient concern. After all, the DPT provided the intellectual and normative basis for President W. Bush's doctrine of preventative warfare. In other words, the invasion in Iraq—part of a long foreign policy tradition of liberal imperialism—was justified by policymakers versed in

the "law-like" idea that democracies don't fight one another (Cox 2013; Smith 2007; Steele 2010). This is not to suggest that religious freedom advocacy abroad will lead to violence on such scales though. Obviously, regime change entails a far greater expenditure of resources than the focused promotion of a single human right. Yet, scholars must nevertheless exercise caution, even with such seemingly low stakes inhering from the implications of their scholarship, because things can still go awry when a foreign policy goal is based on the promotion of a single human right. Just take the invasion of Afghanistan as an example. Inderpal Grewal (2005) describes operations there as a kind of militant humanitarianism thanks to President Bush's efforts to frame the conflict, at least in part, as a fight for women's rights. Other scholars critical of the appropriation of feminist theory take this further, asking how initiatives meant to protect women will "reproduce violence," even noting that, when taken to the extreme, these kinds of "human rights [policies] can be used to justify military intervention" (Bumiller 2008: 136).

Those scholars that see the DPT as the foundation of the U.S.'s highly militarized foreign policy of liberal imperialism generally see its genesis at the end of the Cold War (Cox 2013; Smith 2007; Steele 2010), but as Preston (2013) notes, religious freedom and democratic values have long been paired as an important normative justification for warfare in presidential rhetoric, at least since Franklin Roosevelt led the U.S. into World War II. Fox and Sandler (2004) suggest that this behavior could be much older, as they see these outbursts of liberal imperialism as an attempt to export the American Revolution. Religious revolutions often pose the potential for contagion, as how Iran has indirectly inspired or directly supported several fundamentalist movements since 1979. Of course, Fox and Sandler acknowledge that non-religious revolutions like the American War for Independence and the Russian Revolution can also inspire attempts at export, but when one unmasks the role of religion in the American Revolution, it's apparent that

liberal imperialism—and a concordant commitment to religious freedom, like the nation's broader dedication to human rights—may be thoroughly ingrained into the U.S. identity.

In the autumn of 1774, American revolutionaries began reaching out to the people of Quebec, trying to entice them into the colonial rebellion against England. In an address to the people of Canada, Americans highlighted the rights they shared as subjects of the crown: trial by jury, freedom of the press, and political representation, to name only three. But the letter went on to denounce the Quebec Act of 1774, legislation granting Canadians the right to practice their Catholicism openly. This legislation served as a prominent example of parliamentary overreach, the Americans reasoned, because Parliament never had the authority to grant the people of Quebec their liberty of conscience or religion in the first place. These were God-given rights, and if Parliament could usurp the authority of God to grant such rights legislatively, they could certainly usurp the power to take them away. For this reason, the Americans called on their neighbors to the north to help resist British aggression by joining in the fight—it was the only way to truly protect their religious freedom! Unfortunately, the Anglo-Americans of the colonial period, like Locke, were known for their anti-Catholicism, and when the Quebecoise learned of America's hypocrisy, Quebec opted against revolution (Farrelly 2012).

American "outreach" to the Canadians didn't end there though. As Maura Jane Farrelly (2012: 250) observes, the failure of diplomacy in 1774 "[…] occasioned the first act of military aggression by a quasi-independent American republic [...]." Thus, in December of the following year, the American colonial military invaded and conquered Montreal, presumably attempting to forcibly liberate Quebec from England's tyranny. When the military advanced on Quebec City shortly thereafter, however, it was routed by British forces, giving rise to another diplomatic foray a few short months later. During the spring of 1776, a delegation that included Benjamin

Franklin, as well as Charles and John Carrol, departed for occupied Montreal in an effort to entice the Catholics of Quebec to voluntarily join the American colonies in their revolt against England. The Carrols were from Catholic Maryland, and thus shared the faith of the Quebecoise, but the mission would nonetheless go down in the history books as a failure (Farrelly 2012). Sure, American history might have been very different if the revolution had successfully recruited the people of Quebec at one of these three junctures, but the example stands out as significant just the same because it illustrates that the U.S. has been engaged in what might be interpreted as liberal imperialism (and religious freedom diplomacy) since its founding.

Advocates of a strong religious freedom foreign policy might ultimately counter that their intentions are good though (Steele 2010), and that they would never endorse the kinds of militant humanitarianism on display in Quebec, Afghanistan, or Iraq. But as Westerners, we might still be inclined to ask who would really dissent from the idea that religious liberty presents a strong normative good. However, the operative phrase is "as Westerners." Recall that not only does the RFPT draw heavily on the American Founding Fathers, Smith, or Voltaire (and now Locke), but even Huntington (1993a) concedes that religious freedom and the separation of church and state are Western constructs. It is therefore important to ask if these ideas really can be divorced from their neocolonial or neo-imperial baggage prior to export. More importantly, one should remember that the American foreign policy elite responsible for implementing IRFA's protocols have a job guided more by protecting American interests than by the needs of a people oppressed in some distant land. Once in the hands of the State Department, something as "innocent" or well-intended as the *Annual Report on International Religious Freedom* becomes an instrument of America's pervasive power. Yes, the human rights regime may contribute to normative behavioral changes (which is exactly what religious freedom advocates desire), but these

normative "goods" cannot be separated from the panoptic power structures of American hegemony in which they are produced (Steele and Amoureux 2006). As such, intentions matter little. The RFPT, like the DPT can be usurped by powerbrokers to suit their own ends, so scholars must ultimately be cognizant of the normative implications of their work from the get-go, and that means it's time for the RFPT to take questions of cultural imperialism seriously.

Cultural Imperialism

Although the RFPT is beset by criticisms that IRFA may be unconstitutional, or that religious freedom advocacy abroad could constitute an act of cultural imperialism (Danchin 2010a; 2010b; Hurd 2010; Sullivan 2010), scholars like Farr (2011; 2013) do troubling little to address these problems. In fact, rather than critically interrogating the normative implications of the RFPT, Farr (2011; 2013) generally blames the "cultural imperialism" critique for undermining American religious freedom policy. On one hand, he blames the critique, which he simply dismisses as "internally inconsistent," for eroding the efficacy of IRFA in the Islamic world (Farr 2011: 68). On the other, he laments the fact that similar issues have been raised in the Foreign Service's training programs when instructors ask if the U.S. really has the right to impose its own values on other nations. Since the American Foreign Service isn't adequately being taught about the importance of religion in world affairs, he reasons, these diplomats "have the right to wonder whether they are being trained to […] protest the religious freedom policy mandated by Congress" rather than being trained to execute these policies (Farr 2013: 38).

Dismissing the imperialism-critique will require more than complaints and nebulous assertions about internal inconsistency though, especially since legitimate questions about American cultural imperialism originate primarily from abroad (Cozad 2005; Farr 2013), where IRFA is viewed as a front for Western missionaries. Of course, IRFA came about because of a

concern for the persecution of Christians and when one considers that many members of the Christian Right formed part of the legislative coalition responsible for the passage of IRFA (Hertzke 2004), this criticism becomes more credible. Although Allen Hertzke (2004) believes the legislation was adequately broadened to cover people of all religious traditions, there is still something to the criticism that IRFA was or is meant to open states previously closed to missionary activity, and since the peddlers of religion have long been seen as agents of imperialism, it's fair to say that the multi-faith focus of the legislation does not address this concern. In fact, the religious freedom research agenda's emphasis on the religiously unfree arc of Islam (Hertzke 2004), the dominant geosocial territory in the 10/40 window, and the persecution of Christian missionaries that goes on in this region (Hoover 2009), should only exacerbate these concerns.

Although Hertzke (2004) tries to debunk the imperialism-critique in a more thoughtful manner than Farr (2011; 2013), he argues that the association of Christian missionaries with the agents of imperialism (like Spanish Conquistadors) is hardly more than a manifestation of left-wing hostility against religion in general, and Christianity in particular. Of course, it is true that some on the left are deeply suspicious of religion (i.e., Harris 2004; Maher 2008; Marx 1844), but many affiliated with the Christian Left also take these concerns very seriously. Writing for the Christian Left publication, *Sojourners* magazine, religious freedom advocate David Griffith (2010) writes that he sees the "truth in the charge that missionary activity can damage communities where missionary methods are culturally insensitive, patronizing, or disrespectful." Additionally, Jim Wallis (2016), perhaps the leading figure on the Christian Left in the U.S., views the imperial institutions that gave rise to the U.S., which includes the missionaries who served them, as the source of the systemic racism—America's "original sin"—that persists to

this day (Wallis 2016). In fact, argues Wallis (2008: 260), the West's experience with terrorism, Nazism, and imperialism all demonstrate that "[a] biblical view of the human condition must take [such] evil very seriously." The question, Wallis adds, is not whether or not such evils really exist, but instead how to confront them.

Consequently, dismissing the charges of cultural imperialism as outbursts of left-wing hostility comes off as somewhat disingenuous. One does not even need to point to the concerted efforts by U.S. government agencies and Christian missionaries (Wallis 2016)—or the efforts of their Spanish antecedents (Hertzke 2004)—to disrupt Native American culture to see how real this problem is. In fact, missionaries continued to play an important part in the production of American power well into the 20th century. Sarah Ruble (2012) even connects the American missionary enterprise to the same spirit of Wilsonian internationalism at the heart of the liberal imperialist democratic peace project (Cox 2013; Smith 2007), and this is exactly why countries like Egypt (Sharkey 2008) and India (Cozad 2005) fidget uncomfortably under the thumb of American pressure to liberalize their religious freedom policies.[25]

Even when speaking out on moral problems not directly related to missionary activity, Ruble (2012) argues, Western Christians run the risk of accusations that they are functioning as instruments of American imperialism. The outcry over Uganda's anti-homosexual legislation serves as a case in point. When Christian Evangelicals denounced the draconian proposal as a violation of human rights, some Ugandans, who are of course quite familiar with the role of missionaries in Western imperialism,[26] responded by questioning the international community's attempts to infantilize their nation (Ruble 2012: 158-159), which is important because, as Uday Mehta (1990) observes, the infantilization of the "other" is often used as a key element in the

effort to justify civilizational projects that systematically exclude colonized populations from public life.

The Non-Neutrality of Tolerance

Ultimately, the point is that toleration is never neutral (Brown 2008; Brunstetter 2010; Gray 2015). When tolerance is granted by a majority to minority groups, as it often is, there is often an ulterior motive (Brown 2008). For those connected to the Christian Right agitating for the passage of IRFA, that motive may have been about alleviating persecution for coreligionists or opening the 10/40 window to evangelization. For American policymakers, IRFA policy may just be another extension of national power. Whatever the case may be, tolerance is not usually practiced for tolerance's sake, but instead as a means to an end. Philip Gray (2015) points out that toleration requires some level of conformity and that one can usually find the limits of tolerance where deviants threaten the majority's worldview. This might not be that surprising for advocates of the RFPT; even Farr (2013) admits that "religious liberty "imposes its own limits, the most important of which is equality under the law." However, this is perceived as a limitation on the rights of a majority since it requires acceptance of a minority as equal. In other words, that the rule of law must not be used in a religiously free society to restrict the rights of a religious minority (Farr and Hoover 2009) does not adequately reveal the limits of tolerance inherent in IRFA.

Perhaps more revealing is the claim that minorities cannot "exercise their rights in ways which unduly limit or abrogate the rights of majorities" (Farr and Hoover 2009: 16), and here Farr's (2013: 39) use of scare quotes to describe the notion of same-sex "marriage" becomes enlightening in that it identifies lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) individuals as the deviants at the threshold of tolerance. Farr criticizes President Obama for

treating the rights of the LGBTQ community as superior to religious liberty—the first freedom—and suggests that the threat of establishment today comes not from the Christian churches, but from the pro-LGBTQ secular ideology that seeks to demote religious freedom on the grounds that "error has no rights" (Farr 2013). This may explain the impulse felt by American conservatives to defend the religious liberty of an apparently besieged Christianity via state-level legislative campaigns since the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in *Obergefell v. Hodges* (2015) last summer. While advocates of the RFPT adamantly deny charges of pro-Christian bias in IRFA, many of the advocates of domestic-level religious freedom legislation drop the pretext altogether, suggesting that the legalization of gay marriage that came with *Obergefell* should be viewed as an assault on religious liberty. Farr (2013) even points to the case of a New Mexico-based photographer, arguing that the company should not have been penalized for its refusal to provide services at an LGBTQ wedding. Of course, photographers and cake-bakers are the go-to victims for conservative politicians in the U.S., so their businesses are exactly what these new state-level religious freedom bills are allegedly designed to protect (Merritt 2016). The problem, as hinted at in Chapter 3, is that the LGBTQ community has a putative right to religious freedom (DeLaet and Caufield 2008) as well, which ultimately renders the government's intervention at the limits of tolerance an exercise in interfaith theological arbitration. The problem for IRFA discourse then, is that the state-level debate over religious freedom functions to undermine claims that international religious freedom advocacy isn't biased towards Christianity.

A second problem comes to mind though. Defining religion in accordance with religious freedom policy is inherently a political task with political consequences (see Bosco 2009). As Hurd (2013; 2015) elaborates, the current discourse on international religious freedom reifies a

notion of "bad" religion (e.g., Blair 2011; Kerry 2014) that allows governments to discipline groups that fail to conform to social norms. To paraphrase Daniel Brunstetter (2010: 419), disciplining "bad" religions is a statement about their lack of agency, because their failure to conform to the standards of the majority, however tolerant it may purport to be, can be viewed as a threat to civilization itself (also see Brown 2008). In the case of state-level religious freedom policies, the LGBTQ community and the progressive churches that open their doors to individuals identifying as LGBTQ are the subjects of this disciplining effort.[27] Abroad, the targets of the "bad" religion narrative take different shapes. For example, Hurd (2013) notes a State Department report from 2010 that praised the Central African Republic for generally adhering to the principle of religious freedom. Yet, at the same time, as many as 60% of the women imprisoned throughout the nation were being held on charges of "witchcraft." Hurd alleges that such offenses are easily disregarded by policymakers that view African Traditional Religions (ATRs) as "superstitions," rather than legitimate "religions" sanctioned for state protection, demonstrating that, like the LGBTQ community in the U.S., ATRs in Congo exist at the frontiers of tolerance.

Wither International Religious Freedom?

Religious freedom stands out as an important human right, particularly for those living in the West. Whether or not the tremendous benefits ascribed to religious freedom by proponents of the RFPT can manifest outside of the West has not been shown. At least, where domestic terrorism is concerned, this thesis demonstrates that religious freedom does not reduce political violence. As a result, the argument laid out in this chapter attempts to problematize the RFPT by taking its potential normative implications into consideration. If nothing else, the preceding demonstrates several very real reasons that scholars and policymakers should both learn to take

the dangers and disciplining effects of religious freedom advocacy seriously. In this regard, I have focused primarily on the neocolonial or neo-imperial implications of the RFPT, and have shown that human rights advocacy and tolerance are non-neutral practices often associated with militant humanitarianism or liberal imperialism. Of course, this is a particularly pressing concern since the empirical evidence provides no support for the idea that religious freedom reduces political violence in the non-West, and because religious freedom is a Western construct. Criticisms of cultural imperialism emanating from scholars critical of the religious freedom research agenda and foreign audiences (Cozad 2005; Danchin 2010a; 2010b; Hurd 2010; 2013; 2015; Sharkey 2008; Sullivan 2010) are thus not without merit.

Yet, this is not to suggest that religious persecution is somehow desirable, nor is it to suggest that the religious freedom research agenda be abandoned altogether. Further empirical analysis is still required to determine if the church-state relationship can account for the ambivalence of religion in other spheres of life. I only focus on domestic terrorism because this subject remains understudied in the terrorism studies literature. Instead, I am suggesting a greater reflexive appreciation for one's place in the world, and the impact that one's research can have on the world (Steele 2010). There will be unforeseen consequences—potentially good and bad—with most major policy projects, so the dangers of IRFA should not simply be disregarded or brushed under the metaphorical rug. Instead, policymakers and scholars attached to the RFPT should work to compensate for these problems when they materialize, even if doing so will require critical self-interrogation of one's partisan positions regarding deviants pushed by society to the outer limits of social acceptability.

The RFPT can avoid the trap of cultural relativism by following the advice of the late-philosopher and ethicist, James Rachels (Rachels and Rachels 2010). Rachels argues that

cultural differences can be universally evaluated simply by asking if a practice promotes or harms the welfare of the people it affects. The RFPT certainly has a head start by challenging religious persecution, and it has moved further in this direction by emphasizing international agreement on the various human rights norms articulated in several United Nations' declarations (Farr and Hoover 2009), but in proposing religious freedom as their solution to the world's ills, advocates of the RFPT must also ask if and how their proposals could cause harm in the very societies they seek to help. This chapter only represents a first attempt to explore this problem.

Limitations and Future Research

In addition to its limited focus on domestic terrorism, some scholars may object to a few other problems stemming from this study. First, this study is limited in its temporal scope to a single decade. Expanding the range of data could help determine if the results in this study are robust, though the exhaustive nature of the analysis in Chapter 5 may render such an attempt superfluous. However, there are other data limitations that could present a more serious problem. Namely, a minor risk of omitted variable bias is present. CFS (2009) include the GINI coefficient as a measure for income inequality in their study, but GINI data are very sparse for the nations of Asia and Africa in the period under study. Further research might also want to explore the impact of alternative measures of democracy. As noted in Chapter 4, Vreeland's *X-POLITY* variable removes the problem of instability from the calculus of a state's democracy score. Perhaps most serious though, is the lack of focus on religious terrorism.

One cannot easily code the ideology of an attacker using data from the RDWTI (2016), and while the GDT does make it possible to take ideology into consideration, a problem resulting from the recoding of this data (into the country-year unit of analysis) led to gross miscalculations. So, the RFPT may still have an impact on religiously motivated domestic

terrorist attacks, even if it effect is not strong enough to carry over into the entire universe. The neo-Weberian approach to religious violence requires that this possibility be explored, but given these practical limitations, this project has been saved for future research. It is also worth noting the possibility that this research may very well replicate the findings in Chapter 5 from the outset though, especially given recent scholarship that casts doubt on the nature of religious violence in general and religious terrorism in particular (Armstrong 2014; Cavanaugh 2009; Gunning and Jackson 2011; Klein 2015; Piazza 2009).

There are, of course, several possible avenues for further exploration, and another data problem represents one area where research is desperately needed. Specifically, the religious freedom data in this study are dichotomous in nature, though as outlined in Chapter 3, religious freedom is not an either/or kind of proposition. Proponents of the RFPT may therefore rightly object to my analysis, so it is essential to develop a better measure of religious freedom and the church-state relationship. TPS (2011) conceptualize religious freedom as existing on a four-point spectrum ranging from what might be described as U.S.-style religious freedom to Soviet-style religious regulation. Their typology of church-state relationships, that is, is based on two factors: 1) the degree of consensus between religious and political actors; and 2) the degree of independence between their institutions. This yields four different ways to classify a state's religious regime based on consensual independence (I), conflictual independence (II), consensual integration (III), and conflictual integration (IV). If their typology could be developed into a categorical measure of religious freedom, a range of new hypotheses would open to researchers (TPS 2009: 31-44). A thorough qualitative content analysis of the State Department's religious freedom reports could produce a time-series, cross-national dataset based on TPS's (2011) classification for every country in the world from 2000 to, at present, 2014.

One might also think more seriously about the problem of temporal dependence plaguing the data from the RDWTI (2016). Although this could be an artifact of the RAND Corporation's dataset since it did not materialize in Berkebile's (2015) GTD data, it's possible that there's something more interesting at work. Organizational learning through time could represent a possible explanation. The typologies of terrorism that try to predict the scale of an attack's violence based on a terrorist's ideology perceive religious terrorism as the most violent (Hoffman 2006; Piazza 2009). Religiously motivated violence is also said to dominate the present wave of terrorist violence, which begs the question of whether or not violence could be escalating through time as a result of organizational learning rather than ideology. If learning is taking place, the fact that religious terrorism is perceived as the most deadly could be based on spurious assumptions, and the next wave of terrorist violence could actually be even more deadly, regardless of the perpetrators' ideologies. Interestingly, Piazza (2009) suggests that terror groups become more sophisticated through trial and error, leading to a greater number of fatalities, and finally, Hoffman's (2006) own discussion of internationalization points out the ways terror groups sought out the PLO for learning purposes.[28]

Although the findings in this study were not promising, it is too early to write the epitaph for the RFPT. Still, it is only by thoroughly exploring these possibilities that we can determine if the thesis may be salvaged.

Notes

Chapter 1

[1] The image, by Charles Porter IV (1995), can be accessed from the Pulitzer homepage: http://www.pulitzer.org/winners/charles-porter-iv.
[2] I use the terms homegrown and domestic synonymously.
[3] Before the Paris attacks, Nate Silver (2015), the statistician behind *FiveThirtyEight* that was able to correctly project the winner of the presidential election in 49/50 states in 2008, and who accurately predicted all 50 in 2012, consistently dismissed Trump's odds of successfully clenching the Republican nomination. The betting markets were similarly bearish on his chances, though a string of primary victories have vaulted him to front-runner status, with former Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich (2016) describing the businessman as the party's presumptive nominee (also see Neyfakh 2016).
[4] This is evident in *The Epic of Gilgamesh* (George 2003), one of the world's oldest surviving works of literature. The Sumerian poem chronicles the adventures of King Gilgamesh, ruler of Uruk, an ancient city-state located in modern-day Iraq. Fearful of his own mortality, Gilgamesh sets out on a quest to live forever. Only his failure to successfully achieve immortality leads him to recognize the value of his most significant accomplishment: the construction of the city's formidable walls designed specifically to protect the people of Uruk from nomadic outsiders. It's possible that capitalizing on this fear of the outsider in the wake of a terror campaign represents such a successful political strategy—particularly for conservatives—because the human fear response is biologically hardwired into our DNA, a product of the species' evolutionary survival needs. Since the amygdala is responsible for detecting and alerting the brain to potential threats—and since conservatives tend to have larger amygdalae—our capacity for rational thought can be overcome by the fight or flight instinct until such a threat has passed. Perceptions of fear and threat could then impact an individual's voting decisions. In other words, fear works (Kanai, et al. 2011; also see Bever 2015; Hazen 2014).
[5] At present, I am only aware of two attempts to empirically evaluate the RFPT (see Grim and Finke 2011; Muchlinski 2014). I presented an earlier incarnation of this thesis as a paper at the annual meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion in 2015 that may serve as a third example (see Herrington 2015).
[6] A black and white worldview is generally consistent with Islamic theology's standard division of the world. First, *dar al-Islam*, or the land of Islam, is the region of the world recognized as being legitimately governed by Islamic law (*sharia*) and the *umma* (or the community of all believers). *Dar al-Harb*, by contrast, is referred to as the territory of war, a region of the world ignorant of the tenets of Islam (Armstrong 2002). Generally, this view finds its scriptural basis in the very first sūra of the *Holy Qur'an*, "The Exordium." In this short passage, the *Qur'an* identifies three important agents: God, the friends of God, and the enemies of God. God's friends and enemies—believers and unbelievers, respectively—therefore come to represent the basis of human society (Cook 2000; Dawood 2014; note that where the *Qur'an* is cited, I am referring exclusively to Dawood's English translation). Yet, a third "territory" is also said to exist by some theologians. *Dar al-Sulh* represents the territory of treaty, nations friendly to or at peace with the Islamic World (Esposito 2004). This is one area where ISIS departs from traditional Islamic theology; the insurgency's understanding of the gray zone is clearly at odds with this understanding of the world of treaty.
[7] Religion is a challenging, even controversial, concept, and I have dealt with it at length elsewhere (see Herrington 2012). Since my focus in this thesis is on religious freedom and not on religion *per se*, I do not explicitly define the concept, and instead follow religious studies scholar W. Richard Comstock (1984: 499) who observes that "Augustine's famous observation about time applies with equal force to religion; if not asked, we know what it is; if asked, we do not know." Although one cannot reasonably rely on everyone to understand what religion actually is (Hurd 2015), I trust that my readers will follow the discussion so long as I do not complicate matters with the kind of burdensome epistemological exercise defining the term would require.
[8] Joseph K. Young and Michael G. Findley (2011), for example, maintain that the identity of the victim is inconsequential (also see Sanchez-Cuenca and de la Calle 2009).
[9] Interestingly, the RDWTI (2016), which covers a similar time period, does not record a single terrorist attack as having occurred in Malawi.

Chapter 2

[10] Related studies consider whether or not the clash of civilizations contributes to terrorist groups' public approval ratings by looking at individuals' decisions to support them, but these studies do not really attempt to elucidate a causal connection between the clash and actual acts of political violence (see, for instance, Tessler and Robins 2007; and Zhirkov, Verkuyten, and Weesie 2013).
[11] I use the terms international and transnational synonymously.
[12] Though CFS suggest that the diversity dividend mitigates international terrorism, they do not provide a theoretically satisfying reason to expect domestic cultural diversity to impact transnational terror *inflows*. Data on non-state armed groups indicate that ethnically fragmented states are more likely to sponsor transnational terrorism to appease minority constituents (San-Akca 2009), but this only hints at a theoretical reason to consider the effect of diversity on transnational terrorist *outflows*. Geospatial data shows that territorial conflict in Africa is driven by the partition of politically salient ethnic groups divided by arbitrary borders. If similar logic undergirds patterns of transnational terrorism, the demographic makeup of *a target state* could become theoretically relevant (Goemans and Schultz *forthcoming*; also see Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006). Nevertheless, neither of these possibilities is explored by CFS. Even if they were considered though, their investigation would still require a shift to the directed-dyad as the unit of analysis.
[13] This particular point stands out as interesting because research on multiculturalism in the Netherlands suggests that, rather than facilitating immigrant assimilation, these policies reify cultural differences (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007).

Chapter 3

[14] As is common in the literature, I use "religious freedom" and "religious liberty" interchangeably. However, "freedom of conscience," "religious pluralism," and "religious tolerance," which are also sometimes treated synonymously with "religious liberty" and "religious freedom," are unique concepts with distinct epistemological baggage.
[15] Unfortunately, these thought-provoking strands of modern religious freedom research reify a myth of religious liberty intimately associated with American exceptionalism, possibly legitimizing criticisms of "imperialism" in IRFA policy (e.g., Sullivan 2010; Hurd 2010; Danchin 2010a; 2010b).
[16] It should be noted that Locke was an ardent anti-Catholic. In the *Essay*, however, he suggests that simply worshiping in the way of the Catholic cannot be regarded as a security threat to the regime. While he ultimately refuses to extend religious freedom to Catholics later in the *Essay*, as well as in his *Letter*, that decision is based not on the way they worship, but on a principle of reciprocity discussed below, and the loyalty Catholics were believed to have shown to a foreign prince: the pope (Locke 1667, 1689; Zagorin 2003).
[17] Though Colonial Maryland was founded as a haven for Roman Catholics, the Lords Calvert, the colony's proprietary governors, enacted a policy of religious toleration as early as 1649 (Farrelly 2012).

Chapter 4

[18] Peffley, Hutchison, and Shamir (2015) might question the direction of the causal arrow here. They find evidence that sustained terror campaigns are actually linked to decreases in political tolerance in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By contrast, Grim and Finke (2011) argue that (religious) tolerance and political violence are co-constitutive of one another. Such is the nature of the feedback loop, they aver, that increases in tolerance will lead to reductions in terrorism, while increases in terrorism lead to increases in intolerance, and so on. For analytical reasons, I focus exclusively on the tolerance $\rightarrow$ violence dimension of the feedback look rather than the violence $\rightarrow$ terrorism aspect.
[19] In an indirect way, this may explain why some scholars (e.g., Klein 2015; Piazza 2009) have failed to find evidence supporting Mia Bloom's (2005) theory of terrorist outbidding. While Bloom expects terrorists competing for media attention to become more violent in the presence of additional factions, the religious economy approach shows that extremist organizations competing in a market place of ideas must, for the sake of survival, moderate. Failure to do so will lead to declining membership, and possibly, extinction (Iannaccone and Berman 2006; Madison 1787, 1788; Smith 1776: 846-875).

[20] There are 928 country-years rather than 930 (10 × 93) because Timor-Leste did not achieve its independence until 2002.
[21] It is important to acknowledge that even Locke's thought has been shown to have provided the philosophical framework for the exclusionary practices of the colonial powers (Mehta 1990).
[22] Unfortunately, CFS's (2009) replication data is no longer available.
[23] CFS (2009) measure terrorism using the average number of domestic and transnational attacks inflicted on a state. The averages were calculated from the annual attack totals recorded by the MIPT-TKB. Based on the definition articulated in Chapter 1 though, they exclude cases involving state actors.

Chapter 5

[24] This is the default method by which Stata handles missing values in a statistical analysis.

Chapter 6

[25] One could easily add the People's Republic of China (PRC) to this list. Not only does the PRC have its own conception of religious freedom—one more in line with Locke's original idea of religious toleration—for groups not believed dangerous to national stability, but the Chinese have long been skeptical of attempts to infiltrate the mainland with foreign ideas. Indeed, the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 can be seen as an anti-imperialist backlash targeting Western "missionaries, traders and soldiers" (Wert 2011) that still carries influence in the PRC today.
[26] Consider, once more, the Kingdom of Buganda, where the British "flag followed the cross" in an African colonial venture. Philip D. Curtin (2012) observes that Christian missionaries were welcomed in Buganda because they brought with them the promise of guns and technical knowledge, ultimately exacerbating the civil war there. When the fighting was put down by the British East Africa Company, the British annexed the territory, establishing the Ugandan Protectorate.
[27] Some may even recall, in the run up to *Obergefell*, arguments that actually treated gay marriage as if it posed a clear and present danger to civilization.
[28] Comparative research on democratic learning has handled time in a similar manner (Rohrschneider 1999), so while such an approach could be novel in the terrorism studies literature, it would not be unprecedented.

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Appendix: Data Coding

My dataset on religious freedom and domestic terrorism (RFDT) records information on 42 variables for 93 countries in Asia and Africa over a ten year period from 2000 to 2009, yielding an *n* of 928 country-years.

Variable List

1. year
2. country
3. ethnic_dvrsty
4. religious_dvrsty10
5. religious_dvrstytot
6. religious_freedom
7. population
8. area_sqk
9. gdppcppp
10. mena
11. ss_africa
12. c_asia
13. e_asia
14. s_asia
15. se_asia
16. democracy
17. log_gdppcppp
18. relxrf
19. democracysq
20. pop_log
21. dum2000
22. dum2001
23. dum2002
24. dum2003
25. dum2004
26. dum2005
27. dum2006
28. dum2007
29. dum2008
30. dum2009
31. rattack_dich
32. rattack_tot
33. rfatalities
34. rinjuries
35. rcasualties
36. gdt_dich
37. gdt_tot
38. gdtfatalities
39. gdtinjuries
40. gdtcasualties
41. popdens
42. logpopden

Unit of Analysis: The Country-Year

Year

The RFDT dataset records information over a ten year period from 2000 to 2001 for two reasons. First and foremost, the U.S. State Department's *International Religious Freedom Report* was first issued in a useable form in 2000, meaning cross-national/time-series data on a state's religious freedom prior to the year 2000 are harder to come by. Second, the RAND Corporation's "Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents" (RDWTI) does not yet extend beyond 2009. Though the recent inclusion of data from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism's (START) "Global Terrorism Database" means that the RFDT dataset could be extended through 2014, this remains an objective for future research. For the meantime, data from the GDT included in the RFDT dataset is intentionally limited to the period between 2000 and 2009 to facilitate comparison with data from the RDWTI.

Country

The RFDT dataset records information for 93 Asian and African countries. Following Daniel Cox, John Falconer, and Brian Stackhouse (2009; hereinafter CFS), the RFDT looks at all Asian and African states with a population greater than 1,000,000. This approach also mirrors the coding procedure used by Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman and Brian Min (2009) for their "Ethnic Power Relations" (EPR) dataset, though the RFDT dataset does away with their requirement that cases have a surface area exceeding 500,000 square kilometers. The RFDT dataset also includes Middle Eastern countries, which were excluded by CFS.

Country List:

1. Afghanistan
2. Algeria
3. Angola
4. Armenia
5. Azerbaijan
6. Bangladesh
7. Benin
8. Bhutan
9. Botswana
10. Burkina Faso
11. Burundi
12. Cambodia
13. Cameroon
14. Central African Republic
15. Chad
16. China
17. Congo, Democratic Republic of the
18. Congo, Republic of the
19. Cote d'Ivoire
20. Egypt
21. Eritrea
22. Ethiopia
23. Gabon
24. Gambia
25. Georgia
26. Ghana
27. Guinea
28. Guinea-Bissau
29. India
30. Indonesia
31. Iran
32. Iraq
33. Israel
34. Japan
35. Jordan
36. Kazakhstan
37. Kenya
38. Korea, North
39. Korea, South
40. Kuwait
41. Kyrgyzstan
42. Laos
43. Lebanon
44. Lesotho
45. Liberia
46. Libya
47. Madagascar
48. Malawi
49. Malaysia
50. Mali
51. Mauritania
52. Mauritius
53. Mongolia
54. Morocco
55. Mozambique
56. Myanmar (Burma)
57. Namibia
58. Nepal
59. Niger
60. Nigeria
61. Oman
62. Pakistan
63. Palestine/West Bank
64. Papua New Guinea
65. Philippines
66. Russia
67. Rwanda
68. Saudi Arabia
69. Senegal
70. Sierra Leone

71. Singapore
72. Somalia
73. South Africa
74. Sri Lanka
75. Sudan
76. Swaziland
77. Syria
78. Taiwan
79. Tajikistan
80. Tanzania
81. Thailand
82. Timor-Leste
83. Togo
84. Tunisia
85. Turkey
86. Turkmenistan
87. Uganda
88. United Arab Emirates
89. Uzbekistan
90. Vietnam
91. Yemen
92. Zambia
93. Zimbabwe

Excluded Countries:

1. Bahrain
2. Brunei
3. Cape Verde
4. Comoros
5. Cyprus
6. Djibouti
7. Equatorial Guinea
8. Maldives
9. Qatar
10. Sao Tome and Principe
11. Seychelles

Independent Variables

Religious Freedom

Religious Freedom (religious_freedom) is a dichotomous variable set equal to 1 if religious freedom exists in a state or 0 if religious freedom is absent. The variable was coded based on information contained in the U.S. State Department's (2000-2009) extensive *International Religious Freedom Reports*. As the State Department reports, governments that "generally [respect]" religious freedom are those that "[attempt] to protect religious freedom in the fullest sense." As a result, the State Department treats general respect as the highest level of respect for religious freedom a state may display.

By and large, states that generally respect religious freedom were thus coded as 1. However, as operationalized in the RFDT dataset, *Religious Freedom* seeks to capture the way states behave in practice, and is less concerned with *de facto* policy than the State Department may be. As such, exceptions are made to this general rule of thumb. For example, when the State Department reports that a country, like Jordan for instance, has generally respected religious freedom but immediately follows this pronouncement with a caveat about persistent abuses, a country can be coded as 0.

Attempts were made to standardize this coding procedure though. So, countries seeing significant improvements were often coded as 1. Countries that respect religious freedom are also coded as 1, even if state and local governments fail to do so. This is a levels-of-analysis problem that is worthy of further exploration, but violations by local governments do not (for the purpose of the present study) merit a shift to 0.

Where countries have minor violations of religious freedom coupled with *de facto* policies recognizing one religious institution over another, a judgment call was made based on the information reported by the State Department.

Religious Diversity (10%)

Religious Diversity (10%) (religious_dvrsty10) is a count variable estimating the number of religions in a state with 10% or more of a total population. Estimates were derived from the Central Intelligence Agency's (2000-2009; hereinafter CIA) *World Factbook* by counting the number of religious groups believed to represent more than 10% of the population based on the following coding rules:

First, where data was available, all religious subgroups (e.g., Protestant denominations or Catholics) were counted. If data was unavailable, data was only counted for umbrella groups (e.g., Christianity or Islam).

Second, atheists were counted when the CIA designated nonbelievers as representing 10% of the population or more.

Third, any religious grouping labeled as "unspecified" was not counted, regardless of the size of its population.

Fourth, when religious groups were listed as "other," they were only counted if a specific group was listed as an example with a population percentage of 10% or more. If "other" was listed but no groups were provided as examples, the category was excluded, regardless of its size.

Finally, if no estimated percentages were included, the groups were not counted.

Religious Diversity (Total)

Religious Diversity (Total) (religious_dvrstytot) is a count variable estimating the total number of religions active in a state. Estimates were derived from the CIA's (2000-2009) *World Factbook* by counting each religious group based on the following coding rules:

First, where data was available, all religious subgroups were counted separately. Umbrella groups were not counted unless these data were unavailable, in which case the wider umbrella groups were counted exclusively.

Second, atheists were counted when the CIA designated nonbelievers as representing part of the population.

Third, any religious grouping labeled as "unspecified" was not counted.

Fourth, when religious groups were listed as "other," they were counted. If the category of "other" included no specific examples, it was counted as 1. If, on the other hand, specific groups were listed as an example, the category of "other" was counted as 2 or more depending on how many such groups were identified.

Finally, if the CIA included a note about the number of groups officially recognized by a government, these numbers were only used if they were greater than the number provided.

Control Variables

Ethnic Diversity

Ethnic Diversity (ethnic_dvrsty) is a count variable representing the total number of politically relevant ethnic groups reported in the EPR datset (Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009). Values for countries with surface areas less than 500,000 square kilometers (including Bhutan, Mauritius, and Singapore) were taken from a later version of the EPR modified by Manuel Vogt (2014), as were values for Sierra Leon in 2000 and 2001. Values for the West Bank are estimates based on the total number of ethnic groups reported in the CIA's *World Factbook*.

Population

Population (population) is taken from the CIA's (2000-2009) *World Factbook*, while pop_log is the natural log of *Population*.

Land Area

Land Area (area_sqk) is taken from a country's estimated surface area (sans the water area) as it appears in the *World Factbook* (2001-2009). *Population Density* (popdens) is calculated by dividing *Population* by *Land Area*, while logpopdens is the natural log of *Population Density*.

GDP per capita at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)

States' GDP data are taken for the gdppcppp variable from the CIA's *World Factbook* (2000-2009), while log_gdppcppp is the natural log of that variable.

Democracy

State's democracy scores are taken from the Polity IV dataset.

Region Dummies

Mena (for the Middle East and North Africa)

ss_africa (for Sub-Saharan Africa)

c_asia (for Russia and Central Asia)

e_asia (for East Asia)

s_asia (for South Asia)

se_asia (for Southeast Asia)

Temporal Dummies

Temporal dummies (dum2000-dum2009) were included and set equal to one in their respective years.

Dependent Variables

Terrorism Data from RAND

Domestic terrorism data from the RDWTI was used to count the total number of attacks (rattack_tot) occurring each year, as well as the total number of injuries (rinjuries), and the total number of fatalities (rfatalities) resulting from those attacks each year. The injury and fatality variables were combined to measure the total number of casualties (rcasualities), while a dichotomized variable (rattack_dich) was set equal to one if any attack occurred in a given year (and 0 if rattack_tot equaled 0).

Terrorism Data from START

Additional data was taken from Richard E. Berkebile's modified GDT dataset on domestic terrorism. Using Berkebile's dataset, I counted the total number of attacks (gdt_tot) occurring each year, as well as the total number of injuries (gdtinjuries), and the total number of fatalities (gdtfatalities) resulting from those attacks each year. The injury and fatality variables were combined to measure the total number of casualties (gdtcasualities), while a dichotomized variable (gdt_dich) was set equal to one if any attack occurred in a given year (or 0 if gdt_tot equaled 0).